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INTRODUCTION
 
U.S. law requires that foreign assistance be directed increasingly
 
toward countries which are committed to and are making progress toward
 
"greater equality of income distribution" so as to "help the poor
 
toward a better life." This paper presents evidence on the extent
 
of improvement in economic position of the poor in six less developed
 
1
 
countries and explores the reasons for the differential performances.
 
The volume of poverty and inequality in the world is staggering.
 
Recently-compiled data on absolute poverty and relative inequality
 
in a large number of countries may be found in Tables
 
respectively. Just in the countries assisted by the U.S. Agency for
 
International Development (A.I.D.), more than one billion persons
 
receive annual incomes below $150. In terms of inequality; the
 
richest 5% of income recipients in less developed countries rec-lva
 
incomes five or six times higher than the incomes of the poorest 20%.
 
If the poor in poor countries were compared with the rich in rich
 
countries, the gap between rich and poor would be many times higher.
 
The international development community has awakened to the human
 
dimensions of these data with zalls for "New Directions in Development
 
Assistance" (U.S.A.I.D.), "Meeting Basic Needs" (International Labor
 
Office), and "Redistribution with Growth" (World Bank).
 
1 In an earlier paper prepared for A.I.D. [Fields (1976)], I showed 
that both in theory and in practice the choice of a relative inequality or 
absolute poverty measure of income distribution may make an important 
difference in assessing whether economic development is benefiting the 
poor. My principal concern, and my perception of the concern of the 
international development community, is with the alleviation of absolute 
economic misery. Given this concern, it does not seem desirable ti use 
relative inequality indices to measure changing income distribution. 
Rather, it is more appropriate to use absolute poverty measures such as 
the number of individuals or families with incomes below a constant real 
poverty line or the average gap between the incomes of the poor and the 
poverty line. Most of the discussion in the present paper is therefore 
in terms of absolute incomes and absolute poverty; relative inequality 
comparisons, when they are made, receive less weight in the overall
 
conclusions.
 
Poor majoritu populations in AD-assiated countries 
"POOR MAJORITY" IN AIO ASSISTED COUNTRIES. ACCOROItir TO PROPORTION OF POPULATION RECEIVING 
LIESSTHAI $150 PEPCAPITA PERYEAR (1%9 PRICES) LISTED BY AID REGION AND BY CONTRIBUTION TO -POOR 
MAJORITY" POPULATION OF THE REGION I 
Percent of popula- "Poor majnarlv"Total population firn receiving population(millions) $150 per capita (millions) 
Near East and South Asia:India ,51-5) ................................... 3... 91
57.0 48. 7 
Paki:tan (including Bangladesh) (66-7) .............. 111.3 72 80.5
 
Ept(64-5) .................................... 33.3 50 16.6
Turkey (158)..................................... 35.2 45 15.9
ka (63) .................................... 12.5 63 8.5
Tunisia (70) ..................................... 4.1 52 
 2.5 
Relional subtotal............................... 734.7 83 612.7 
East Asia: 
7Thailand (6).. ................................ 34.7 65 22.6Korea. South (7) .................. 32.0 45 14.4
Philippines (11).................................. 37.1 32 11.9
Vietnam, South (64) .............................. 17.9 44 7.9
 
Rgtional subtotal ............................... 121.7 47 56.8
 
Afbis: 
Sudan (63) .................................... 15.2 81 12.3
 
Tanzania (67) .................................. 13.2 91 12-0
Kenya (63-9) ..................................... 10.8 86 9.3
 
Madagascar (60) ................................. .L5 11 5.7
Malawi (69) ...................................... 4.5 96 4.3
Chad (58)........................................ 3.2 
 96 3.1Senegal (60) ..................................... 3.8 69 2.6
Dahomey (59) .................................... 2.5 94 2.3
Ivory Coast (70).................................. 4.2 45 1.9
 
Sierra Leone (63-9) .............................. 2.S 70 1.8
Zambia (59) ...................................... 4.2 20 .8

Botswana (71-2) ................................... 6 84 .5
Cabon (68) ........................................ 22 .
 
fegional subtol ............................... 71.7 79 56.7
 
Latin America: 
Brtzil (;0) ........................................ 3 4S 42.1
Colombia (70) ..................................... 21.1 42 8.9
 
Peru (70-1) ...................................... 13.6 35 4.8
Ecuador (70)..................................... 6.1 70 4.3
Dominican Repubho (69) ........................... 4.3 3 1.6
Chile (El) ....................................... 9.3 16 1.6

ElSalvador (63) ................................. 3. 5 43 1.5
Honjuras (7-8) .................................. 2.6 58 1.5
 Guatemala (C5).................................. 5.2 22 1.1
 
Uruguai(67) ..................................... 2.9 23 .7
Jamaica (58)..................................... 2.0 27 .5
Costa Rica (71)................................... L 7 14 .2
 
Panama (69) ..................................... 1.5 16 .2
 Guyana (55-6) .................................... 9 28 .2
 
Regional subtotal ............................... 18. 7 41 69.2
 
All ,aglens (37 countries) ........................ I, 036.8 72.5 795.4
 
I Countries In:lu'.ed are !he 37 AIO-3ssisled cenuntrie 'or which i'icome ditritutionn dafl ate reoorted in Shall Jan 
"Size Distrbuliun of incenme: Lonvrn:a:,,n of O:t.a ' I)D. iank Slzl, ,orkirv P?,er (n. 191. :1cvmt~er li.t. 27 AID. 
Issisted ccuntl aiime nut inc!ta.1 tor ofIn: tr:t)t.!t in dla.. i !,e'e rte:At.'1l; tin, lOliVia, aulu.-Ifg, Catrcron,OIl.h Sie 
Central Afri:,n Pu,,-,c, I I ,ii .3, 6. i.I ,,. l. G..n a, i:iIll. Iri=tii s.3., ,Omer v..:.ic. .3C5.Les-itno. LiL.ri3. Mfls,Morocco , , P)r.li ,Jyr , S. ,, ,. , m, i ro..'u ;ic and Zilrr-. tut.a:'ta. r:J. o, Unrcer I : ,a
the total 1b0oTot';Ltu-ri ca ;'nrij it vin f .4'; ctwCi _1~ liroied in. 0 ~i rcla to jl.. %, tr Ifle ouorjrc.tio table. The ictta;d ant -juicu,. la, I cs a: .ahnes, r',:.j:ion ano Uil)P t.tl are Ter19.0 i:n,re, ;r:9
prices in aul caies). '., t~t tar I.il::,n. Sol": l. c: :e. 1a1t -1, :;jlaii . IriaiI a. .I. OaJ n. S rutt Voctria,. [ y;a t 
t,.ln5 ie 
and Zambia, Hicfe .ftt. nij f: ,tu1 .nd Ii- toTtma Inc.mleal til1i1. U...). 0. jJ (i') ih,;; ;?I. .1l.e: 

distribution Cata ire shawn in it'i. to. : hL Call I .",%
.l i Ira oauifi in tic tide fln *tl[(tiiia 1 th *JO 
CiteJ above were .ri.ntt:,J i tlie iini : itrune ,ra. c% uc.o:r.,)i-' 1:ual sucCrni.., of Iva pupulJ'..n. lo C31irIAjP. Mea 
Va ceiit ortPr'n -ii'jtion i :r .3vita U o , 1a i! , i1isrl.,t-,ii. nir Cloi in.nr I:a ch :cju i.m.i:ifl eo 
,the to1013GDOt,i40trftn0it Lour{iI Ihi* .rc :&',..,- ten dlvi!t i y the number or in:ivihis i.r trait SU'.:r i.t Oftile total l'oIiii3O niiv, JdU, ,J. 1OP11' vt i1'N.1i~llotonIrcule Ic it I IIAr U,.,nt: rol e lf lainch cvCii;.$150 as a 7o:Ce.::c olxwit I licr.;lt ILLi 4l, r,, , ' ',,I i ar.: i ijvil.r -, aI a. L:r I uti cn -,It;iih t ill r,:(lrval, tie ar'rA I*StIe rerentir~e i0e21nli 1eLl. I tae a'IIIr III1.. llr cl;llries arfie,;rsclt'J tnin feL1o013was ictermin,:a by ttiu mclrituiJ 
1(1te por micority of tio L;ouitilun, c01. .. 
Source: The source tc;rthe vPtlatnon anj COV t .ures Acre The"U.N. :tai'chal Yearbnok g.," and the "U.N. Year­bo4oK at ftilhtina At:.aunts t.1,i,,;c, IWt I, V. !11' Ill .. e .. li ill. 6:iP i1w l..loi in,,exe", fotid itl "flro,,% tialion.i1 Pra,!ur:l," 
e'#/I.,ere o 
Chad Dihonlf. and tLluii.3 I' 3,:Iijtois wi l t til ari an a1 ipiioot Icialje iaonltablet Allica or Laitiilitn rnica i0d 
AID, FM,SR 1911. um IL ..Ivert all tOVl hIiie tO l-trJ ofciecs. (I ic¢coiosa: t~llvaa., Jiiaiit:3, br Laria 
U.N.Statislical Ycaruooo,l'/,.) 
Source: A.I.D. (1975).
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INCOME SHARES RECEIVED BY QUINTILESTABLE.' SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL IMCOME BEFORE TAX IN 56 COUNTRIES: 
OF RECIPIENTS IN THE NEIGIIBOIRIOOD OF 1965 
Percentllesof reciricnis Mia'imum GDP perhesd 
C sualy and Ilvlof GDP pa ild 
5l.1ow.0 1: 21-40 " 41-60" 61-40". 11.95 96-1005 
G;nifatto equillatioR
pctccntsec 
in1965(US 3) 
Under$100 
Chad (1959) 
Dahomey (1959) 
Niger (19601 
Nigeria (1959) 
Sudan (1969) 
Tanzania (1964) 
Burma (1Q58) 
India (1956-57) 
Madagascar (1960) 
Group average 
8.0 
3.0 
7.8 
7.0 
5.6 
4.8 
10.0 
3.0 
3.9 
7.0 
11.6 
10.0 
11.6 
7.0 
9.4 
7.8 
13.0 
22.0 
7.8 
10.0 
15.4 
12.0 
J3.6 
9.0 
14.3 
11.0 
13.0 
16.0 
11.3 
13.1 
22.0 
20.0 
.3.0 
16.1 
22.6 
15.4 
15.5 
22.0 
18.0 
19.4 
20.0 
18.0 
19.0 
22.5 
31.0 
18.1 
20.3 
22.0 
22.0 
21.4 
23.0 
32.0 
23.0 
38.4 
17.1 
42.9 
28.2 
20.0 
37.0 
29.1 
0.35 
0.42 
0.34 
0,.51 
0.40 
0.54 
0.5$ 
0.33 
0.53 
0.419 
25.0 
30.0 
25.0 
40.9 
30.7 
41.0 
28.5 
24.0 
39.0 
31.6 
68 
73 
SI 
74 
97 
61 
64 
95 
92 
78.1 
Morocco (1965) 
Senegal (1960) 
Sierra Lcone (1968) 
Tunisia (1971) 
Bolivia (1968) 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (1963) 
Pakistan (1963.64) 
South Korea (1966) 
Croup average 
7.1 
3.0 
3.8 
5.0 
3.5 
4.5 
6.5 
9.0 
.3 
7.4 
7.0 
6.3 
5.7 
8.0 
9.2 
11.0 
14.0 
8.6 
7.7 
10.0 
9.1 
10.0 
12.0 
13.8 
15.5 
18.0 
12.0 
12.4 
16.0 
16.7 
14.4 
15.5 
20.2 
22.0 
23.0 
Ili 
44.5 
28.0 
30.3 
42.6 
25.3 
33.9 
25.0 
23.5 
31.6 
20.6 
36.0 
33.8 
22.4 
35.7 
18.4 
:0.0 
12.5 
24.9 
-
7.bo 
0.56 
0.53 
0.53 
0.44 
0.37 
0.26 
0.463 
. 45.4 
44.0 
44.1 
44.9 
41.0 
32.5 
:7.0 
19.0 
37.2 
180 
192 
142 
187 
132 
140 
101 
107 
147.6 
1201-300 
Malaya (1957-58) 
Fiji (19(8) 
Ivory Coast (1959) 
Zambia (1959) 
Brazil (1960) 
Ecuador (196 ) 
El Sal%ador (1965) 
Peru (1961) 
Iraq (1956) 
Philippines (1961) 
Colombia (19(4) 
Group asrrare 
6.5 
4.0 
3.0 
6.3 
3.5 
6.3 
5.5 
4.01 
2.0 
4.3 
2.2 
4.5 
11.2 
8.0 
10.0 
9.6 
9.0 
10.1 
6,5 
4.3 
6.0 
8.4 
4.7 
8.0 
15.7 
13.3 
12.0 
11.1 
10.2 
16.1 
8.8 
8.3 
8.0 
12.0 
9.0 
113 
22.6 
22.4 
15.0 
15.9 
15.8 
23.2 
17.8 
15.2 
16.0 
19.5 
16.1 
18.1 
26.2 
30.9 
26.0 
19.6 
23.1 
19.6 
28.4 
19.3 
34.0 
28.3 
27.7 
23,7 
17.8 
21.4 
29.0 
37.5 
38.4 
24.6 
33.0 
48.3 
34.0 
27.5 
40.4 
32.0 
0.36 
0.46 
0.43 
0.48 
0.54 
0.28 
0.53 
0.61 
0.60 
0.48 
0.62 
0.499 
26.6 
31.7 
35.0 
37.1 
41.5 
27.5 
41.4 
4S.2 
48.0 
35.8 
48.0 
33. 
278 
295 
213 
207 
207 
202 
249 
237 
285 
240 
2"15 
214.4 
Gabon (1960) 
Costa Rica (1969) 
Jamaica (1958) 
Surinam (196:) 
Lebanon (1955-60) 
Barbados (1951-.52) 
Chilc (19'i1 
Me.xico (1963) 
Panama (1969) 
Group average 
2.0 
5.5 
2.2 
10.7 
3.0 
3.6 
5.4 
3.5 
4.9 
4j 
6.0 
8.1 
6.0 
11.6 
4.2 
9.3 
9.6 
6.6 
9.4 
7.9 
7.0 
11.2 
10.8 
14.7 
15.8 
14.2 
12.0 
11.1 
13.8 
12J 
14.0 
15.2 
19.5 
20.6 
16.0 
21.3 
20.7 
19.3 
1 .2 
18.0 
24.0 
25.0 
31.3 
27.0 
27.0 
29.3 
29.7 
30.7 
22.2 
27.4 
47.0 
35.0 
30.2 
15.4 
34.0 
22.3 
22.6 
28.8 
34.5 
30.0 
0.64 
0.50 
0.55 
0.30 
0.55 
0.45 
0.44 
^ 53 
0.48 
0.494 
51.0 
40.0 
41.5 
23.0 
41.0 
32.9 
33.0 
39.5 
36.7 
37.6 
368 
360 
465 
424 
440 
368 
486 
441 
490 
426.9 
$501.1 000 
Republic of South Africa (1965) 
Argentina (1951) 
Trinidad and TobL'o (1957-58)Venezuela ((96.2 
Grcecc (1957) 
Japan (1962) 
Group ae'rage 
1.9 
7.0 
3.44.4 
9.0 
4.7 
5.1 
4.2 
10.4 
9.19.0 
10.3 
10.6 
8.9 
10.2 
13.2 
14.616.0 
13.3 
15.8 
13.9 
26.4 
17.9 
24.322.9 
17.9 
22.9 
22.1 
18.0 
22.2 
26.123.9 
26.5 
31.2 
24.7 
39.4 
29.3 
22.523.2 
23.0 
14.8 
25.4 
0.58 
0.42 
0.440.42 
0.38 
0.39 
0.433 
43.7 
31.5 
32.930.6 
29.5 
28.9 
32.9 
521 
782 
704 
904 
591 
O38 
723.3 
$1001.2 0) 
Israel (1957) 
United Kingd'om (1964) 
Nethcr!nds (IWY)Federal Repubiik of Gcnnany (1964) 
France (19,)2) 
FinLnJ (1)62) 
Italy (194S) 
Puerto Rico (1963) 
Norav (%1) 
Australia (1966-67) 
Group at erge 
6.8 
5.1 
.05.3 
1.9 
2.4 
6.1 
4.5 
4.5 
6.6 
4.7 
13.4 
10.2 
10.010.1 
7.6 
8.7 
10.5 
9.2 
12.1 
13.4 
1J 
18.6 
16.6 
16.013.7 
14.0 
15.4 
14.6 
14.2 
18.1 
17.8 
13.9 
21.8 
23.9 
21.618.0 
22.8 
24. 
20.4 
21.5 
24.4 
23.4 
22.2 
28.2 
25.0 
24.819.2 
23.7 
23.3 
24.3 
29.6 
25.1 
24.4 
23.7 
11.2 
19.0 
23.633.7 
25.0 
1.0 
:4.1 
22.0 
15.4 
14.4 
20.9 
0.30 
0.38 
0.420.45 
0.50 
0.46 
0.40 
0.44 
0.35 
30 
0.401 
21.2 
28.1 
30.032.9 
36.5 
33.5 
28.8 
32.1 
24.9 
22.2 
1243 
1590 
14001667 
1732 
1 568 
011 
1101 
1717 
1823 
19.04832 
$2001 an. above 
D,:nmark (16)) 
Sweden (163) 
United States(1969) 
Group ieroge 
5.0 
4. 
5.6 
5.0 
108 
9,6 
12.3 
10.9 
18.8 
17.4 
47.6 
17.9 
24.2 
24.6 
23.4 
24.1 
26.3 
26.4 
26.3 
:6.3 
16.9 
17.6 
14.8 
16.4 
.0.37 
0.39 
0.34 
0.365 
25.4 
8.6 
24.5 
26.2 
2078 
2406 
3 233 
2572J 
Source: Paukert (1973, Table 6).
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Many observers have noted that as countries grow many of their
 
people remain in poverty. Lipton (1976) and Griffin (1977), for
 
example, give evidence of persistent poverty for selected groups in
 
particular countries, even rapidly-growing ones. The value of their
 
work is to point out that economic growth alone is insufficient to
 
guarantee decent standards of living for all. 
But identifying certain
 
groups who remain poor does not tell us how many have progressed.
 
What we need, and what this paper seeks to provide, is a comprehensive
 
overview of progress or lack of progress toward alleviating poverty.
 
We must know by how much poverty is being alleviated in the course
 
of economic development and why different countries progress at differ­
ent rates. Six case studies are presented below.
 
The broad framework for analysis is that of dualistic economic
 
development. This concept dominates current thinking in the economic
 
development field. The essential idea of dualistic models is that
 
poor countries' economies can usefully be divided into two broad groups:
 
a 
modern sector, which utilizes up-to-date production processes and
 
pays satisfactory incomes to those in it; and a traditional sector,
 
which uses less advanced methods and whose members receive incomes
 
not far from subsistence. Economic development consists of upgrading
 
the traditional sector. There is some disagreement on how this is
 
to come about. For the most part, leading development economists
 
(e.g., Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis (1964), and Kuznets (1966)) see the
 
1For example, the various indicators of persistent poverty are the
 
income share of the poorest x% in one country, the wages of landless
 
laborers and small farmers in another, the pure labor share of national
 
income in a third, and so on.
 
5
 
expansion of employment in modern sector jobs as the essence of economic
 
development in poor countries. An alternative view --- that countries
 
develop by transforming traditional sectors into modern ones --- is
 
held by a small but distinguished minority (e.g. Schultz (1963)).
 
To measure the various components of dualistic economic development,
 
it would seem at first that we could simply look at the rate of growth of
 
income of the modern and traditional sectors. Unfortunately, that
 
way of measuring the participation of the poor in economic growth
 
will not work. Here is why. Suppose we knew that a country's modern
 
sector grew by 10% and its traditional sector did not grow at all.
 
One possibility is that those who were already in the modern sector
 
experienced income gains of 10% and those still in the traditional
 
sector experienced no income gains whatever; if this were the case,
 
the growth would have been highly uneven and the poor would not have 
shared in it at all. Bult another possibility consistent with the same 
sectoral growth rates --- 10% in the modern sector, 0% in the tradi­
tional sector --- is that average incomes in the modern sector might 
have fallen by 10% on average, 20% more people might have found relative­
ly high-paying jobs in that sector and so left the traditional sector, 
and average traditional sector incomes rose for the remaining population; 
in this second case, the growth would have been highly favorable to 
the poor. The important point is that from just the data on rates of 
growth of output in modern and traditional sector activities, we can 
not determine whether or not the poor are sharing in economic development. 
Another way that the participation of the poor is sometimes
 
measured is by looking at the growth rates of income among particular
 
6
 
decile groups, either directly or using a more formal procedure such
 
as that suggested by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974). The problem with
 
this is that it gives a mistaken impression for a particularly important
 
kind of economic growth. Consider a simple ten person economy with
 
the following distribution of income: (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,5). Suppose
 
the edonomy's modern sector grows and creates one more job with an
 
income of 2 and some poor person is hired to fill that job. The new
 
income distribution is (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,5) and the decile growth
 
rates are (0,0,0,0,0,0,0, +100% 0,0), ie., economic growth is recorded
 
only in the eighth decile (third highest) even though the only beneficiary
 
was a poor person! Clearly, decile income growth rates will not work
 
esther.
 
A preferred method for analyzing dualistic economic development
 
is to distingu'sh the enlargement and enrichment components of each
 
sector's growth, where enlargement refers to the number of people in
 
that sector and enrichment iefers to the average income gain among
 
thew.1 Letting year 1 be the base year and year 2 the terminal year,
 
denoting the labor force frequencies in the modern and traditional
 
sectors by fm and ft respectively, and representing their respective
 
wages by WM exrd Wt, national income in each year is Y = Wmfm + Wtft
 
The change in income between the two years is the sum of four terms
 
which have the following economic meaning:
 
iFor further details of this methodology, see Fields (1975).
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Modern sector Modern sector
 
enlargement effect enrichment effect
 
(a) (0)
 
2~ +
+(W2' 1 1f'-f) tW2- 1t ft 
Interaction between Traiitional sector
 
modern sector enlarge enrichment effect
 
ment and enrichment
 
effects
 
(y()
 
- Enlargement of the high income sector
 
- Change in the number of persons in the high income sector,
 
multiplied by the income differential between the high income and
 
low income sectors in the base year;
 
- Enrichment of the high income sector
 
- Change in income within the 'high income sector, multiplied by the
 
number of persons who were originally in that sector in the base year;
 
y - Interaction between enlaigement and enrichment of the high income sector 
- Change in income within the high income sector, multiplied by the change 
in the number of persons in that sector; 
- Enrichment of the low income sector 
- Change in income within the low income sector, multiplied bv the 
number of persons who remained in that sector in the terminal year. 
Note that negative enlargement and enrichment effects are both possible.
 
Negative enlargement would occur when a sector shrinks in size, while
 
negative enrichment would result when real incomes in tbht sector fall,
 
We might distinguish between three stylized development typolagies
 
as follows:
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TABLE DEFINITION OF DUALISTIC DEVELOPM 1T TYPOLOGIES
 
Distribution of 
the tabor Force 
Between the Modern Modern Traditional 
Sector and the Sector Sector 
Development Typology Traditional Sector Income Income 
Traditional Sector Remains the Remains Rises
 
Enrichment same the same
 
Modern Sector Remains the Rises Remains the
 
Enrichment same same
 
Modern Sector More workers in Remains Remains the
 
Enlargement modern sector the same sane
 
It is easily verified that for these three pure cases,
 
a= AY, 0 y= 6=.0 for modern sector enlargement grcwth,
 
=
8 AY, y= 6= 0 for modern sector enrichment growth, and
 
6- AY, a= O- y= 0 for traditional sector enrichment growth.
 
In the mixed case, the percentage of growth attributable to each of
 
the pure cases depends on changes in the economy's wage structure
 
and occupational structure over the development period. In several
 
of the countries analyzed in this paper, the available wage and
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employment data give useful insights into the size of the enlargement
 
and enrichment components in major economic sectors.
 
Before proceeding, a word should be mentioned about the data.
 
The six countries studied here were selected according to the availa­
bility of data on income distribution for at least two points in
 
time at least a decade apart. I have made a serious effort to assure
 
comparability between various censuses or surveys in each country.
 
On this basis, some seemingly good data countries (e.g., Colombia,
 
where Berry (1974) and others have estimated income distribution going
 
back to the 1930s) were rejected.
 
The countries chosen for analysis are Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, India,
 
Brazil, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The country studies are presented'
 
in that order. The paper concludes with a summary of the major findings.
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COSTA RICA
 
Let us begin by reviewing aggregate data on changes in the Costa
 
Rican economy since the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 1971, gross domes­
tic product doubled in real terms, a particularly good performance; of
 
the countries covered in this paper, only Taiwan grew faster. By 1971,
 
per capita GDP was U.S. $586, which implies that Costa Rica ranks in
 
Latin America's "upper middle class."1 Growth slowed in the 1970s
 
and the economy suffered from serious inflationary pressures and balance
 
of payments d-tfficulties.
 
Income inequality in Costa Rica is moderate; the Gini coefficient
 
iu 1971 was 0.45, which is about at the midpoint for less developed
 
countries as a whole but relatively low by Latin American standards;
 
see Table
 
The growth in the Costa Rican economy seems not to hare engendered
 
any major change in the composition of national incofe. The share of
 
industry has risen and the share of agriculture fallen somewhat, but
 
not drastically; see Table
 
The general growth of production and the small reduction in agri­
culture's share of GDP reflect the growth of export-oriented commercial
 
agriculture. Trade is very important to the Costa Rican economy. The
 
ratio of imports to gross domestic product is about 0.31,which is very
 
2
 
high by international standards. Exports increased in value from $89
 
million in 1960 to $231 million in 1970. About 70% of exports are
 
accounted for by coffee, bananas, meat, and cocoa.
 
1By comparison, GDP per capita was $493 for Brazil, $336 
for Colombia,
 
$332 for Peru, $206 for Iolivia, and $97 for Haiti.
 
2The cowitries of the Central America Common Market have an average
 
ratio of imports to GDP of 0.28. Other countries at a similar stage of
 
development range from 0.27 (Kenya) to 0.09 (several South American countries)
 
Source: UNCTAD (1976, Tables 1.2, 6.1A).
 
Table
 
Costa Rica: Distribution of National Income by Industry
 
Percentage of Gross
 
Domestic Product
 
Industrial Classification 1960 1965 1970 
Agriculture 26% 24% 23% 
Industry 15 18 20 
Construction 4 5 4 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 21 20 21 
Transportation 4 4 4 
Other 28 29 28 
Total lOC% 100% 100% 
Source: National Accounts Statistics, 1975, Vol. III, Table III.
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Income distribution data for Costa Rica are available from specially­
conducted household surveys in 1961 and 1971. Data on the labor force,
 
employment, wages, and other aspects of the Costa Rican economy are
 
derived from the Population Cen3uses of 1963 and 1973. In recognition
 
of the two year gap between the data sources, we will refer to these
 
dates as the "early Sixties" and "early Seventies" respectively. 
The source for the income distribution data in the early Seventies
 
is the report by Cespedes (1973). For the early Sixties, the source is
 
an unpublished estimate derived from a Survey of Family Income and Expendi­
tures conducted by the Central Agency for Statistics and Censuses in
 
Costa Rica. Although this source is widely-cited in subsequent work by
 
the the Economic Commission for Latin America, the World Bank, and others,
 
details of the survey are extremely sketchy.
 
On the assumption that the income distributions for the early Sixties
 
and early Seventies are derived in similar fashion, we may compare absolute
 
incomes and relative inequality at the two points in time. The basic data
 
are presented in Table
 
Our concern in this paper is with measuring how much of the economic
 
growth is received by households at different points in the income distri
 
bution. The way this is usually done in economic development studies is
 
to draw a Lorenz curve and then to compute one or more relative inequality
 
measures. The Lorenz curves are shown in Figure When Lorenz curves
 
cross, as in the figure, one inequality index may show an increase in
 
inequality while another indicates a decline. The most frequently used
 
measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is the ratio of
 
the area betwcen the Lorenz curve and the 45? line to the entire triangle.
 
Table 13
 
Costa Rica: Income Distribution Change, Early Sixties to Early Seventies.
 
Absolute Income 
Monthly Income Share (in 1971 colones) Change in Percentag2 
Family Early a Early b Early , Early Absolute Change in 
Income Sixties Seventies Sixties Seventies Income Absolute Income 
Decile 
1 2.6% 2.1% 195 248 + 53 + 27Z 
2 3.4 3.3 255 384 +131 + 51% 
3 3.8 4.2 285 490 +205 + 72% 
4 4.0 5.1 300 603 +303 +101% 
5 4.4 6.2 330 730 +400 +121% 
6 5.4 7.5 405 883 +478 +118% 
7 7.1 9.3 535 1085 +550 +103% 
8 9.3 11.7 700 1378 +678 + 97% 
9 14.0 16.2 1050 1895 +845 + 80% 
10 46.0 .34.4 3445 4104 +659 + 19% 
Total 100.10Z 100.0% 745 11.75 +430 + 58% 
Top 5% 35.0% 22.8% 
Top 1% 16.0 8.5 
Gini Co­
efficientc) .521 .445 
Real GDP Growth +102% 
GDP per capita, constant colones 2430 3840 1410 + 58% 
Notes: a) ECLA (1969) 
b) Cespedes (1973) 
c) Jain (1975) 
* Estimated 
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Figure
 
Costa Rica: Lorenz Curves, 1961 and 1971.
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Source: Cespedes (1973). 
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We can see in the figure and in the table that inequality, as measured
 
by the Gini coefficient, declined by a substantial amount between the
 
early Sixties and the early Seventies. Many would interpret this as
 
the middle and
evidence that the lower classes did at least we well as 

upper classes.
 
There is a growing awareness among development economists that
 
relative inequality measures like the Gini coefficient provide very
 
little information about changing economic position of the poorest seg­
ments in scciety. For this reason, overall inequality measures are being
 
supplemented by less aggregative analyses of the income shares of particu­
lar decile groups. Such calculations are presented in Table for
 
Costa Rica.
 
The data on changing income shares would ordinarily be interpreted
 
We observe a small decline in the sharer received by the
as follows. 

lowest deciles, a very large decline in the share of the richest, and
 
gains for the other seven deciles. This pattern---falling shares at
 
the top and bottom of the income distribution and rising shares in the
 
middle---would be seen by many as evidence that the middle class gained
 
2 Research would be directed toward
a'. the expense of the rich and poor.

iThis type of research is facilitated in no small measure by the
 
World Bank's publication of decile income shares for 81 countries in
 
the world; see Jain (1975).
 
2For example, we have a 1975 speech by the Minister of Planning: "In
 
the last ten years, however, the relative position cf the poorest 40%
 
of the population has not improved. In effect, between 1958 and 1971,
 
the average annual growth of GNP was in the neighborhood of 8%, while
 
the growth in income of the lowest 40% of the population was approximately
 
5%, which indicates that their relative position worsened. In other
 
words, there was a concentration of income, which was fundamentally in
 
favor of the middle class." (Arias, 1975, p. 11).
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finding out how the middle class mobilized themselves to bring about
 
so substantial a redistribution. Concerned scholars evaluating the
 
Costa Rican experience would also note that the smallest gains (in both
 
absolute and relative terms) were received by the lowest deciles---those
 
who presumably have the greatest needs. Costa Rica would be cited
 
as yet another instance of "growth without development."1
 
These inferences from decile income changes, I submit, are largely
 
fallacious. The reason is simple. The poor may benefit from economic
 
growth by becoming employed in higher-income activities. In the termin­
ology of dualistic development models such as those described in the
 
introduction, this might be termed "modern sector enlargement growth."
 
However, for a variety of reasons---which might include lack of resources,
 
entrepreneurial capacity, or political will---che modern sectors in
 
poor countries may not grow fasf enough to create sufficient advancement
 
opportunities for everyone. In modern sector enlargement growth, some
 
of the poor experience income gains, but the growth will be recorded
 
in the higher deciles rather than the lowest. This statistical anomaly
 
may well be a large part of the explanation for the changing patterns
 
in Costa Rica.
 
Evidence of considerable modern sector enlargement may be gleaned
 
from several pieces of information, presented in Table Consider
 
first the occupational distribution of the labor force. A disproportion­
ate share of the low income population is in agriculture. The data show
 
that while the labor force grew by 48%, the number of farmers and
 
cattlemen grew by only 11%. All other occupational groups showed above
 
1The terminology is from Seers 
(1969).
 
Table
 
17
 
Costa Rica: Employment and Income by Occupation,
 
Industry, and Education, Early Sixties and Early Seventies.
 
Employment (in thousands) 
Early Sixtiesa) Early Seventiesb) Percentage Approximatec) 
Median Income, 
Occupation Number % Number % Change 
Early Seventies 
(in colones) 
Professionals 
and technical 21 5% 47 8% +126% 2600 
Manager 5 1 10 2 + 88 1800 
Office Workers 21 5 34 6 + 62 1600 
Storekeepers 
and vendors 30 8 46 8 + 52 1200 
Farmers, 
Cattlemen, etc. 187 47 208 35 + 11 n.a. 
Other 131 34 240 41 + 83 700 
Total 395 100% 585 100% + 48% 800 
Employment (in thousands) 
d)Early Sixties - e)Early Seventies Percentage fMeanf) 
Income 
Industry Number % Number % Change (incolones) 
Agriculture, 
forestry, hunt­
ing & fishing 194 49% 213 36% + 10% 793 
Mining, electri­
city, gas & water 5 1 7 1 + 40 1372 
Manufacturing 45 11 70 12 + 54 1213 
Construction 23 6 39 7 + 68 1203 
Commerce 39 10 68 12 + 75 1539 
Services 68 17 119 20 + 75 1624 
Other 21 6 69 12 +228 1134 
Total 395 100% 585 100% + 48% 
- continued on next page ­
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- Continuation of Table -
Employment (in thousands)
 
Early Sixtiesg)h)Early Seventies1 )'J ) Mean k)
Education 
and Percentage Income 
Literacy Number % Number % Change (in colones) 
No education 134 15% 131 10% - 2% 637 
Primary, grades 1-3 323 37 335 26 4% 971 
Primary, grades 4-6 312 37 587 45 + 88%.
 
Secondary 80 9 213 16 +166% 1695 
Inc. 2823 
University 20 2 57 4 +185% Com. 5255
 
Total, -c e
 
ten and over 870 100% 1323 101% + 52%
 
Literata 745 86% 1188 90% + 59% n.a.
 
Illiterate 124 14 135 10 + 9 n.a.
 
Total, age
 
ten and over 869 100% 1324 100% + 52%
 
Sources: a) Censo de Poblac16n, 1963, p. 76
 
b) Censo de Poblac16n, 1973, p. 61
 
c) %.spedes (1973), p. 113
 
d) Censo de Poblaci6n, 1963, p. 261
 
e) Censo de Poblaci6n, 1973, p. 67
 
f) Cdspedes (1973), p. 114
 
g) Censo de Poblaci6n, 1963, pp. 520-521
 
h) Censo de Poblaci6n, 1963, p. 474
 
i) Censo de Poblaci6n, 1973, p. 309
 
J) Censo de Poblaci6n, 1973, p. 333
 
k) Cdspedes (1973), p. 111 
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average gains in employment. Since these are the better-paying occupations,
 
this provides one piece of evidence that the Costa Rican economy grew
 
by expanding the share of modern sector workers in to"al employment---the
 
essence of modern sector enlargement growth. The industrial data show a
 
similar pattern. The fast-growing sectors in terms of employment were
 
those associated indirectly with the modern sector (construction, commerce,
 
a more moderate rate.
transportation); manufacturing itself increased at 

In other words, there was a relative shift from agriculture to commerce
 
and services. Educational data support the supply side of the picture.
 
Despite the rapid growth of population, we find that the number
 
with no education declined absolutely and the number who completed only
 
the first three years of primary education rose by just 4%. In contrast,
 
the number with four to six years of education increased by 88%, the
 
number of secondary school graduates by 166%, and the number of university
 
In short, the Costa Rican economy is growing, creating
graduates by 185%. 

more modern sector job opportunities, and educating the skilled labor
 
force needed.
 
Is there also evidence of income gains among those already in the
 
modern sector and of enrichment (or impoverishment) of those left behind?
 
these questions, we require occupation- or industry-specific
To answer 
wage or income data. This type of data is not available for Costa Rica. 
Let us now turn to the case of Sri Lanka where such information is avail­
able.
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SRI LANKA
 
The period of analysis in Sri Lanka is the twenty years extending
 
from 1953 to 1973. Income distribution data are available from large
 
scale national household income and consumption surveys for the three
 
years 1953, 193, and 1973 and from the census of 1971. It happens that
 
the early 1960's marks a turning point in respect to economic and social
 
policy, moving from an open to a closed economy and then approaching
 
welfare statism.
 
Sri Lanka is a poor, slow-growing country. It is, however, firmly
 
committed to the alleviation of poverty at present and it is making
 
The poor are gaining absolutely and relatively;
impressive progress. 

Unlike Taiwan, in which we shall see
the reverse is true of the rich. 

that poverty alleviation and inequality reduction are due to growth,
 
in Sri Lanka, declining poverty and inequality are due to redistribution.
 
Let us now examine the record.
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In the late 1940's and early 1950's, Sri Lanka followed an export­
oriented course. The overall development strategy was to stimulate the
 
modern export sector and use the surpluses generated to fund investment
 
elsewhere in the economy. Around 1960, this strategy broke down because
 
the export sector did not generate enough foreign exchange to pay for
 
needed imports. Consequently, the economy turned inward. Severe import
 
restrictions and nearly prohibitive tariffs were instituted in the hopes
 
of improving the balance of payments. Underlying these moves was the per­
ceived insufficiency of domestic savings and capital inflow. Shortages
 
of capital and intermediate goods appeared, living standards were reduced
 
for many, and aggregate economic-growth ground nearly to a halt. By 1963
 
(the second year for which we have income distribution data) Sri Lanka
 
had closed her economy, redirected production toward locally-produced
 
goods for domestic consumption, and was devoting an unusually large share
 
of its national product to consumer goods.
1
 
The inward-looking development policies of the early and mid sixties 
also ran into difficulties. In part, this was because of an unanticipated 
deterioration in world prices for Sri Lanka's major exports---tea, rubber, 
and coconuts, -hich together account for ninety percent or more of export 
earnings. In part too, the strategy of industrialization via import substitu­
tion had a number of negative features: price distortions, overvalued 
exchange rates, and low interest rates. The balance of payments situation 
worsened in the 1960's and economic growth was seriously impeded. Those 
2
 
difficulties persist up to the present.
 
1For an in-depth discussion of economic policy at the time, see
 
Snodgrass (1966).
 
2For recent economic developments, see the Central Bank's Review of
 
the Economy for various years.
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The Sri Lankan government has come to emphasize income distribution
 
and sought to lessen inequality. According to one expert: "Economic
 
planners in Sri Lanka have the view that the increase in Gross National
 
Product alone is not a sufficient indicator of economic progress because
 
even with a relatively high annual growth rate, the Gross National Product
 
could be unequally distributed resulting in serious income disparities.
 
In view of this, there has been a great deal of emphasis on redistributing
 
existing income and wealth in Sri Lanka because the addition to income,
 
due to the relatively low rate of economic growth, has been inadequate
 
to make an appreciable impact on the incomes of those in the lowest income
 
brackets." [Karunatilake, (1975), p. 702.] Redistributionist policies
 
have been in force in Sri Lanka since the early 1960's but the major push
 
has come since 1970. The measures adopted include both rural development
 
policies (price guarantee, for paddy, land refornf,rural credit, irrigation,
 
and legislation to protect tenant farmers) as well as more general measures
 
(free rice ration, ceilings on income, wealth, and assets,more progress­
ive taxation, subsidized transport, free education). Some would say that
 
Sri Lanka is living far beyond her means. Yet, these welfare policies
 
are part of a deliberate attempt to alleviate poverty through redistribution.
 
The data show that Sri Lanka has been succeeding.
 
The income distribution data for Sri Lanka come to us from Consumer
 
Finance Surveys.and from a recent census. The surveys have been conducted
 
by the Central Bank at ten year intervals. Although the sampling frames
 
1For instance, this characterization was voiced by the ILO Employment
 
Mission in 1971.
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are not entirely equivalent,1 they appear close enough that inter-temporal 
2 
comparisons appear warranted.
The Consumer Finance Surveys indicate modest economic growth: approxi­
mately 15% gains in real mean per capita income from 1953 to 1963 and 
from 1963 to 1973 (see Table ). These rates are higher than real 
per capita GNP figures. The difference is thought to be due to a chang­
ing functional distribution in favor of the household sector. 
By all accounts and measures, income inequality declined over the 
perio6 of study. The Lorenz curve clearly shifted inward, (Figure 
the Gini coefficient of inequality declined from 0.46 to 0.35, the income 
share of the richest decile fell from 41% to 28%, and the income share of 
the poorestd#cile increased from 1.9% to 2.8%. As is clear from the 
data, most of the inequality reduction took place in the decade 1963-73. 
We also find substantial reductions in absolute poverty.3 Drawing 
the poverty line at Rs. 100 (in constant 1963 prices), the percentage of 
income recipients with incomes below that line fell from 63% in 1953 to 
59% in 1963 and 41% in 1973. Using a higher poverty line (Rs. 200), the 
corresponding figures are 86%, 84%, and 72%. 
iFor details, see Karunatilake (1975, pp. 705-707).
 
2For Sri Lanka there also exists a study of changing income distribu­
tion by Rasaputram (1972). That study uses the Consumer Finance Surveys
 
for 1953 and 1963. However, for 1969/70, data were drawn from a Socio­
economic Survey. The Socio-economic and Consumer Finance Surveys are not
 
comparable, even in the definition of income. Therefore, Rasaputram's
 
evidence will receive no further mention.
 
3The poverty measure used is the percentage of income recipients below
 
a given amount. Other measures, such as the average income received by the
 
poor or the Sen index of poverty, could not be computed from the available
 
data.
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Table
 
Sri Lanka: Income & Income Distribution, 1953-1973
 
1953 	 1963 1973
 
(1) GNP Per Capita, Current a)
 
605 	 690 1120
Rupees, National Accounts 

(2) GNP Per Capita, Constant a),b)
 
Rupees, National Accounts 665 690 735
 
(3) Mean Per Capita Income, Monthly
 
Current Rupees, Consumer
 
107 	 134 228
Finance SurveysC) 

(4) Mean Per Capita Income,
 
Monthly, Constant Rupees%)
 
117 	 134 150
Consumer Finance Surveys 

(5) Percentage of Total Income
 
Received by Decile G oups
 
of Spending Units :c)
 
Lowest 1.9% 1.5% 2.8%
 
Second 3.3 3.0 4.4
 
Third 
 4.1 4.0 5.6
 
Fourth 5.2 5.2 6.5
 
Fifth 6.4 6.3 7.5
 
Sixth 6.9 7.5 8.8
 
Seventh 8.3 9.0 9.9
 
Eighth 10.1 .11.2 11.7
 
Ninth 13.2 15.5 14.9
 
Highest 40.6 36.8 28.0
 
(6) Gini Coefficient Among
 
Spending Unitsc) 0.46 0.45 0.35
 
(7) Distribution of Absolute incomes
 
Among Income Recipients (in Constant
 
1963 Rupees):c),d)
 
Less than 100 	 63%1 591 41%,
 72 %31j100-200 23j 86% 25 84% 

200-400 6 12 25
 
4 3
Over 400 	 8 

100% 100% 100%
 
Notes: 	a) Source: Jain (1975, Table 6).
 
b) Deflated by price index for Colombo
 
c) Source: Karunatilake (1975, p. 712-715)
 
d) Approximate
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Figure 
Lorenz Curve 
Sri Lanka: 
Showing Distribution of 
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What accounts for Sri Lanka's success in alleviating absolute poverty
 
and relative inequality despite unimpressive aggregate growth? Among
 
the factors that may be examined are education, demographic change, urbani­
zation, changing employment structure, and social welfare policies.
 
Some aspects of educational change are seen in Table Illiteracy
 
was reduced from 31% to 23% between 1953 and 1963 and remained at about
 
the same level between 1963 and 1971. The proportion without schooling
 
has exhibited a steady decline (42% in 1953, 37% in 1963, and 24% in 1973)
 
and the proportion with secondary education a steady increase (from 10%
 
in 1953 to 24% in 1973). At the same time, and perhaps because of the
 
greater supply of relatively well-educated workers, educational differ­
entials narrowed, especially from literacy through secondary level.
 
Another aspect is demographic change. Young workers became less
 
nuterous in proportional terms between 1963 and 1973.1 Since young workers
 
2
 
earn less than others, this compositional effect would tend to reduce
 
inequality.
 
Interestingly, urbanization does not 
appear to be a major component 
of economic development in Sri Lanka. To the contrary, rural development 
is the key. Some data on locational aspect of economic activity are given 
in Table . Most of the population growth (between 65% and 75%) took 
place in rural areas. In addition, unlike most other countries, urban 
incomes grew more slowly than rural incomes. Consequently, the bulk of 
I1n 1963, 5.5% of income recipients were below age 18 and 20.0% below
 
age 25. The corresponding percentages in 1973 were 3.7% and 18.9%.
 
2Mean two-month income in 1973 was Rs. 
133 for those under 14 and
 
Rs. 169 for 14-18 year olds as compared with Rs. 455 for all income
 
recipients.
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Table
 
Sri Lanka: Education Data, 1963 & 1973
 
(1) Proportion Literate, by Sexa) 1953 1963 1971 
Male 
Female 
80.7% 
55.5 
85.6% 
67.3 
85.2% 
70.7 
Total 69.0% 76.9% 78.1% 
(2) Prcnortion of Population by 
Educational Levelb) 1953 1963 1973 
No Schooling 
Primary 
Secondary 
Passed GCE/SSC 
Higher and Technical 
41.6% 
46.8 
9.8 
0.9 
0.9 
36.6% 
39.3 
19.6 
3.4 
1.1 
23.6% 
42.7 
23.8 
8.8 
1.1 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.6 
(3) Median Income, Current Rupees, 
by Educational Levelc) 
1963 
Median As % of As % of 
Income, Median for Median for 
Educational Level Rs. Primary Higher 
Median 
Income, 
Rs. 
1973 
As % of 
Median for 
Primary 
As % of 
Median for 
Higher 
No Schooling, illiterates 
No Schooliag, literates 
Primary 
Secondary 
Passed GCE/SSC 
Higher 
106 
153 
167 
257 
475 
563 
63% 
92 
100 
154 
284 
337 
19% 
27 
30 
46 
84 
100 
197 
300 
344 
450 
617 
740 
57% 
87 
100 
131 
179 
215 
27% 
41 
46 
61 
83 
100 
a) Source: Statistical Pocket Book of Sri
 
Lanka (Ceylon) (1975, Table 11)
 
b) Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon (1963, Table 12)
 
and Karunatilake (1975, Table 9)
 
c) Source: Karunatilake (1975, Table 10)
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Table
 
Sri Lanka: Locational Aspects of Economic Activity,
 
1953,1963, & 1973.
 
(1) Population by Location
 
(in millions)a) 1953 1963 1972
 
1.2 1.9 2.3
Urban 

Rural. 6.1 7.6 9.2
 
Estate 0.9 1.2 1.4
 
Total 8.3 10.6 13.0
 
(2) Mean Income by
 
Percentage
Location (in current 

Change
 
1963 1973 1963-1973
 
441 601 +26%
Urban 

248 458 +84%
Rural 

126 227 +80%
Estate 

V.1 Sri Lanka 253 442 +75%
 
(3) Location 	of Economic
 Percentage 	 Percentage of
 
Total Change
Activity (in thousands Change 
of current Rupees) 1963 1973 1963-1973 1963-1973 
508 772 +52% 21%
Urban 

71%
1266 2171 +72% 

193 294 +53% 8%

Rural 

Estate 

+65% 100%
All Sri Lanka 1966 3237 

a) Source: Karunatilake (1975, p. 728).
 
b) Source: Karunatilake (1975, p. 734).
 
c) Computed from (1) and (2).
 
"Estate" refers to agricultural plantations.
 
Most of these are small villages but some are
 
so large as to constitute their own towns.
 
* 
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the gain in economic activity (about 70%) was concentrated in rural areas.
 
Agricultural development is due in part to the Green Revolution and in
 
part to the public policies cited above. An assessment of the relative
 
importance of the various parts of the rural development program has not
 
yet appeared.
 
We may also iook into the distribution of employment by industry or
 
occupation. In some countries,lthese distributions are found to shift
 
decidedly in favor of the higher-paying industries and occupations, reflect­
ing the creation of new income opportunities. In Sri Lanka, however, the
 
data reveal only vague tendencies in this direction (see Table ). The
 
Industry distribution changed only a little over our period of analysis,
 
not enough to make much difference. The occupational distribution changed
 
but in no clear direction. As would be expected, employment in agricul­
ture grew at a below-average rate, itn share therefore declining. Where
 
the relative gains occurred is unclear. Middle-level occupations show
 
a mixed pattern: clerical, sales, and transport occupations grew at rates
 
well above average, but service employment declined. At the upper end
 
of the distribution, professional and technical employment increased at
 
an above average rate but administrative and managerial employment exhibit­
ed an absolute decrease. From this lack of a pronounced tendency overall,
 
it.might be suspected that Sri Lanka's economic development benefited the
 
poor within occupational groups (i.e., traditional sector enrichment)
 
rather than by transfering the poor between occupational groups (i.e.,
 
modern sector enlargement). Unfortunately, the requisite cross-tabula­
tions needed to test this speculation do not seem to have been produced.
 
1For example, Costa Rica, 
as we have just seen.
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Table
 
Sri Lanka: Distribution of Employment by Industry and Occupation,
 
1953, 1963, and 1971.
 
1953a) 1963a) 1971b)
Employment Distribution by Industry 

.griculture, mining, and related 53.4% 53.2% 50.8%
 
Manufacturing 10.1 9.8 9.6
 
Services (Public) 16.1 15.5 13.5
 
Commerce, transport, and communication 11.7 13.2 13.8
 
Other 8.7 8.3 12.3
 
Total Gainfully Employed 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Change Percentage
 
1963 1971 1963-71 Change
 
(in (in (in 1963-71
 
thousands) thousands) thousands) 
Employment Distribution by Occupation 
Professional, technical, and related 
workers 143 176 + 33 + 23% 
Administrative and managerial workers 33 12 - 21 - 64% 
Clerical and related workers 118 189 + 71 + 60% 
Sales workers 212 277 + 65 + 31% 
Agricultural and related workers 1654 
1659 1791 +138 + 8% Mining and related workers53 

Transport and communication workers i1'
 
892 +158 +.22%
 Craftsmen and production workers 6333" 734 

Service workers 259 196 - 63 - 24%
 
N.E.C. 41 88 + 47 +146%
 
Total Gainfully Employed 3,199 3,621 +423 + 13%
 
Sources:
 
a) Statistical Pocket Book of Ceylon (1968, Table 18)
 
b) Statistical Pocket Book of Sri Lanka (1975, Table 18)
 
c) Statistical Pocket Book c Ceylon (1968, Table 19)
 
d) Statistical Pocket Book of Sri Lanka (1975, Table 19)
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Finally, there is the impact of the government's social welfare
 
policies. Taken together, the free rice ration, free education and health
 
services, and subsidized food and transport add up to half the government
 
One study1
 budget. These expenditures are directed toward the poor. 

estimates that these public goods and services raise the incomes of the
 
poor by about one-third while lowering the incomes of the richest by a 
corresponding amount (though, of course, by a lesser percentage); see 
Table But note too that the adjustments for social welfare policies 
are not sufficient to account for the changes in income distribution 
between 1953 and 1973, that is, much of the change was due to a changing
 
distribution of earned income and not just to the impact of socially­
oriented public expenditures.
 
Some observers of the Sri Lankan economy question the appropriateness
 
of early attention to social welfare, taking the view that aggregate growth
 
might have been faster had social expenditures been less. This may be so,
 
but confirmaticn of this view requires detailed modeling of a sort not yet
 
undertaken. In any case, even if the speculation were correct, it is not
 
at all clear whether poverty alleviation would have been greater or less
 
had a poverty-oriented strategy not been followed. All we can go by is
 
the record of poverty alleviation. On that score, Sri Lanka comes out
 
looking quite favorably.
 
1Jayawardena (1974).
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Table
 
Sri Lanka: Estimated Effects of Social Benefits
 
on Income Distribution, 1963.
 
Percentage of Income in Spending Unit, 1963
 
Unadjusted for Adjusted for ,
 
Deciles Social Benefits Social Benefits
 
Lowest 1.5 2.0
 
Second 3.0 3.8
 
Third 4.0 2.7
 
Fourth 5.2 7.5
 
Fifth 6.3 6.8
 
Sixth 7.5 7.6
 
Seventh 9.0 9.5
 
Eighth 11.2 11.1
 
Ninth 15.5 15.0
 
Highest 36.8 34.0
 
Gini Coefficient 0.45 0.40
 
* 
These consist of subsidy on rice, losses incurred by public
 
transport, free education and health services.
 
Source: Jayawardei.a (1974).
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INDIA 
India is a miserably poor country. Per capita income is under $100. 
45% of her people receive incomes less than U.S. $50 per year and 90%
 
below U.S. $150. Of the total number of absolutely poor in the world,
 
more than half are Indian. During the 1960s, per capita private consumer
 
expenditure grew by less than 1/2% per annum. India's poverty problem
 
is so acute and her resources so limited that no imaginable internal policy
 
change could be expected to improve things much.
 
India offers abundant data on the distribution of income and consump­
tion dating back to the 1950s. Given the richness of the data in so
 
poor a country with so large a research establishment, it is not surprising
 
that we find a multitude of income distribution studies. Some of the
 
findings from some of the more important of these are reported in Table
 
The data in Table differ with respect to the concept of income
 
or consumption employed, the procedures by which the figures were derived,
 
and the years for which the distributions were estimated. The remarkable
 
feature about the relative inequality data is that no clear pattern of
 
change emerges. More specifically:
 
(1) Overall, as measured by the Gini coefficient, relative income
 
inequality shows no particular trend. Possibly, the income share of
 
the bottom 20% rose and the share of the top 20% fell nationwide, to­
gether suggesting diminished inequality, but both changes are small.
 
Since Lorenz curves crossed, o.her relative inequality measures would
 
probably have yielded similarly inconclusive results.
 
(2) The Gini coefficient within the urban sector may have risen
 
somewhat, suggesting greater inequality, but the evidence is mixed.
 
(3) The GCni coefficient within the rural sector seems to have
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Estimates of Relative Income Inequality,
Endia: 

Varloits Years and Stucies
 
A. Study by hnttv (1974) Data from NCAER 
Year 
Income Distribution 'easure 1961-62 1964-65 1967-68 1968-69 
Cini Coefficient of Household
 
0.46 0.43
Income Distribution, Rural India 0.41 0.35 

Data from NSS and National Accounts
B. Study by Ojha-Bhatt (1974) --

Year
 
1953-55 1963-65
Income Distribution Measure 

Share in Personal Disposable Income
 
7% 7%
Bottom 20% 

!0% 48%
Top 20% 

Gini Coefficient
 
0.371 0.375
National 

0.392 0.448
Urban 

0.341 0.319
Rural 

Data from NSS and 'National Accounts
C. Stuby y__Ranadi ve (1973) --

Year
 
1953-54 1961-62
nroCI t ribution 91Bzure 
Share of Total Personal
 
Disposable Income
 
7.50% 7.80%
Bottom 20% - Estimate A 

7.20% 7.60%
Bottom 20% - Estimate B 

44.34% 45.47%
Top 20% - Estimate A 
45.89% 46.70%Top 20% - Estimate B 

Gini Coefficicit
 
0.340 0.317
Rural 

0.453 0.487
Urban 
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TABLE (Continued)
 
D. Study by Ahmcd and Bhattacharya 

Income Distribution Measure 

Share of Pre-Tax Personal Income
 
Bottom 20% 

Top 20% 

C¢ni Coefficient 

E. Study by Bardhan (1974) -
Incom6 Distribution Measure 
Cini Coefficient of Expenditure 
Rural 
Urban 
F. Study by Minhas (1970) 

Income Distribution Measure 

Colisumption Share, Rural
 
Poorest 5% 

Richest 5% 

Gini Coefficient, Rural 

(1972) --
Data from NSS and Hational Accounts 
Year 
1956-57 

6.9% 

49.4% 

0.418 

Data from NSS
 
1963-64
 
7.6% 
45.6%
 
0.372
 
Year
 
1958-59 1960-61 19A3-64 1967-68 1968-65
 
0.340 0. 21 0.297 0.293 0.310
 
0.348 0.350 0.360 0.345 0.350
 
Data from NSS, Rural India
 
Year
 
1956-57 1960-61 1964-65 1967-68
 
1.36% 1.46% 1.47% 1.48%
 
15.76% 16.82% 13.33% 13.24%
 
0.32 0.31 0.29 0.29
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declined, suggesting lesser inequality, but the changes are not large.
 
Since the large majority of the population is rural, this suggests that
 
nationwide inequality also diminished somewhat.
 
In summary, given the contradictory indications as to whether inequal­
ity increased or decreased and the small magnitudes of the chi.nges as
 
compared with probable errors in sampling and measurement, it appears
 
warranted to conclude that the pattern of relative inequality in India
 
changed little but what change there was probably was in the direction
 
of lesser inequality.
 
A leading Indian economist, P.K. Bardhan, takes issue with relative
 
inequality measurements of income distribution. He contends: "For a
 
desperately poor country like India, there are many who believe that
 
no measure of inequality which is in terms of relative distribution and
 
is independent of some absolute poverty standard can be entirely
 
satisfactory". Accordingly, he has calculated estimates of the percent­
age of the population below a constant absolute poverty line: Rs. 15
 
per capita per month at 1960-61 prices in the rural sector, Rs. 18 in
 
the urban sector.2 His results, shown in Part A of Table are striking:
 
1Bardhan (1974, p. 119).
 
21n Bardhan (1974, pp. 119-124), he describes how these poverty
 
lines are computed. The minimally-adequate diet for a moderately active
 
adult as recommended by the Central Government Employees Pay Commission
 
consists of 15 oz. of cereals, 3 oz. of groundnut and 6 oz. of vegetables
 
per day, totaling 2100 calories and 55 grams of protein. To figure the
 
family income required to achieve this diet, Bardhan works out the cost
 
per adults, adjusts for family make-up by the adult-equivalent ratio,
 
expands to a requisite family income figure using the ratio of food to
 
non-food expenditures, divides by family size to obtain a per capita
 
amount, and finally deflates by the official Agricultural Labour Consumer
 
Price Index for the appropriate year for the rural poor and by the official
 
Working Class Consumer Price Index for the urban poor.
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Bardhan estimates that absolute poverty worsened greatly in India over
 
1
 
the 1960s even though relative inequality did not. Note particularly
 
the comparison with Bardhan's own relative inequality estimates in
 
part E of Table
 
Several other studies have also estimated absolute poverty changes
 
in rural India. Bardhan's conclusion that absolute poverty increased
 
in India during the 1960s was sustained in a paper by Ojha (1970)
 
published contemporaneously with Bardhan's original work (1970). Defining
 
poverty according to consumption of foodgrains rather than in rupees,
 
Ojha found that the incidence of absolute rural poverty increased
 
considerably between 1960-61 and 1967-68 (see Part B of Table
 
Further corroborating evidence may be found in a study by Vaidyanathan
 
(1974), who estimated that real per capita consumption declined for 
each fractile group in the rural population and the proportion below a 
zonstant absolute poverty line increased. (Part C). 
Before accepting the conclusion that absolute poverty worsened in 
India in the 1960s, we should also take note of contradictory evidence 
presented by another eminent Indian economist, B.S. Minhas. In a 
1970 study, Minhas reported a declive in absolute rural poverty (see 
Part D of Table ). 
After looking into the conflicting data at some length, I would
 
side with Bardhan and others who conclude that Indian poverty increased
 
during the 1960s. Among the possible sources of divergence are the
 
1Brdhan (1974, p. 131) notes: "The direction of change in the
 
estimates of poverty is the same if one takes the various alternative
 
minimum standards for the poverty line suggested in the literatuze."
 
(Emphasis in the original.)
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Table 
India: Estimates of Absolute Poverty in the 1960s.
 
A. Study by Bardhan (1974) 1960-61 1964-65 1968-69
 
Rural, percentage below 38% 45% 54% 
Ks. 15 per capita per month* 
Urban, percentage below 32% 37% 41%
 
s. 18 per capita per month*
 
B. Study by Ojha (1970) 1960-61 1967-68 
70%
Rural, percentage whose con- 52% 

sumption of foodgrains was
 
below nutritional norms
 
1967-68
C. Study by Vaidyanathan (1974) 1960-61 1964-65 

Rural per capita expenditure
 
(monthly) by fractile group*
 
Rs. 6.3 9.0 7.0
0-5% 

8.4 10.6 8.75-10% 
10.3 10.6 8.7
10-20% 

12.5 12.4 10.6
20-30% 

14.5 13.3 12.4
30-40% 

16.4 15.1 14.3
40-50% 

16.4
18.8 17.5
50-60% 

21.4 22.2 19.160-70% 
25.1 23.8 22.4
70-80% 

31.8 30.2 27.780-90% 
40.9 35.8 34.6
90-95% 

72.2 65.7 51.0
95-100% 

All groups 21.5 20.3 18.0
 
Rural population, percentage with 60% 60% 68%
 
per capita consumption below Rs. 
20 per month, NSS data* 
1967-78
D. Study by Minhns (1970) 1960-61 1964-65 
Rural, percentage below 46% 39% 37%
 
Rs. 20 per annum
 
* In 1960-61 prices. 
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following:
 
(i) Bardhan uses a poverty line set at Rs. 15 per month (at
 
1960-61 prices). Minhas presents poverty data alternately for two
 
The Minhas poverty line is
figures, Rs. 200 and Rs. 240 per year. 

therefore higher than Bardhan's, but this does not influence computations
 
of changing poverty in any particular way.
 
(ii)) Although Bardhan and Minhas both worked with consumption data
 
from the National Sample Surveys, they did so in different ways.
 
Bardhan used the rural and urban distributions separately. Minhas,
 
however, appears to have constructed an overall income distribution for
 
all India and then estimated rural and urban distributions by applying
 
the ratio of rural to urban consumption to the overall distribution.
 
For this procedure to be correct, it must be assumed that the shapes of
 
the rural and urban distributions are the same, though at different
 
levels. But it is well known that the shapes are not the same, the
 
rural distribution being more equal than the urban. It follows, therefore,
 
that Minhas overstates the incomes of the rural poor and understates
 
the number below an agreed-upon rural poverty line. It is not clear
 
what Minhas' methodology implies for estimates of changing income distri-

But there is little doubt that Minhas' estimates are
bution over time. 

less accurate than those of Bardhan.
 
(iii) Another important difference between the studies is in the
 
adjustment for inflation. Bardhan used the government's Agricultural
 
Labor Price Index, which doubled between 1960-61 and 1967-68. Minhas,
 
on the other hand, used the implicit National Income Deflator, which
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showed a much lower increase (+70%). For this reason, Bardhan tends to
 
show more poverty in the latter 1960s than does Minhas. The qualitative
 
issue is resolved, though, when Minhas' estimated distribution is
 
deflated by the Agricultural Labor Price Index rather than by the National
 
Income Deflator. The use of these different price adjustments accounts
 
for about half the difference between the two estimates of poverty in
 
1967-68:
 
Table
 
India: Percentage of Rural Population Below Rs. 200
 
Per Annum at 1960-61 Prices.
 
Estimate 1960-61 1967-68
 
Minhas' distribution estimate 46.0% 37.1%
 
Minhas' distribution estimate
 
deflated by Agricultural Labor
 
Price Index rather than by
 
National Income Deflator 46.0% 49.2%
 
Bardhan's distribution estimate
 
deflated by Agricultural Labor
 
Price Index 46.0% 63.1%
 
[Source: Bardhan (1971, Table 1)]
 
It seems to me that the rural farm laborers price index is more
 
appropriate in India where 80% of the population is rural. When this
 
index is used, even Minhas' distribution estimate indicates increasing
 
absolute poverty. When Bardhan's distribution estimates are used, the
 
increase in rural poverty is even greater.
 
In summary, whether absolute poverty and relative inequality were
 
alleviated or exacerbated in the 1960s in India depends on which study you
 
believe. For our purposes, the most important finding is that relative
 
inequality measures are found to suggest one set of conclusions with
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respect to changing income distribution while absolute poverty comparisons
 
suggest another. Relative income inequality inay have declined a little.
 
Some observers have inferred from this that although India did not grow
 
very fast it had at least "held the line" on income distribution. When
 
the figures are re-examined from an absolute poverty perspective, we see
 
that they did not hold the line at all. Rather, absolute poverty appears
 
by most accounts to have increased considerably.
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BRAZIL
 
We will begin our study of Brazil at 1960, the date when the
 
first comprehens ve overview of income distribution became available.
 
At the time the Brazilian economy was in chaos. Growth was low,
 
inflation rampant, the economic future uncertain, and political
 
instability imminent. Following the military takeover of 1964,
 
one of the first priorities of the new regime was economic stabiliza­
tion. Whether the policies of the new government were responsible for
 
the subsequent improvement or whether things would have gotten better
 
anyhow is a matter of some discussion, since they both continued old
 
policies (encouraging savings and investment, promoting exports, support­
ing industrialization) and introduced new ones (indexing, flexible and 
realistic exchange rates, tax reform). In any event, 1964-67 was a
 
period of marked reduction in inflation, creation of a favorable market
 
environment, and the encouragement of investment from all sources includ­
ing foreign capital and multilateral lending. The time from 1967 to
 
1974 marked the so-called Brazilian economic miracle. Real GNP doubled
 
over that period reflecting an average growth rate of 10% per year. Since
 
1974, economic growth has slowed, due to a combination of factors including
 
the higher cost of imported petroleum after 1974, the frost of 1975
 
which destroyed nearly all of that year's coffee crop, and serious balance
 
of payments difficulties which caused the government to tighten up on
 
monetary and fiscal policy. Throughout,Brazil has followed a more capital­
istic, market-oriented development strategy than nearly any other devel­
oping country.
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National population censuses were conducted in 1960 and 1970.
 
These provide benchmark data on income distribution, even though they
 
do not conform to turning points in the growth cycle. During the
 
1960s, income grew by 79%, income per capita by 32%. The income distribu­
tion for 1970 was absolutely superior to the 1960 distribution, i.e.,
 
a smaller fraction of the population was below any given income level
 
aad conversely any given population group had a larger average income
 
than before. This shift is illustrated in Figure
 
If a poverty line defined according to Brazilian standards is drawn
 
and we examine the distributions above and below the line, the follow­
1
 
ing findings emerge:
 
(1) The entire income distribution shifted in real terms, benefiting
 
every income class.
 
(2) There was a small decline in the fraction of the economicafly
 
active population classified as below the poverty line (according to my 
estimates, from 37% to 35 1/2%), but those who remained "poor" exper­
ienced a marked percentage increase in real income (from one-third to
 
as much as two-thirds higher).
 
(3) The percentage increase for those below the poverty line was
 
greater than the increase for those not in poverty, and may well have
 
been twice as high or more.
 
(4) The relative income gap between "poor" and "non-poor" persons
 
narrowed in terms of ratios although the absolute gap widened.
 
(5) The bulk of the income growth over the decade accrued to persons
 
above the poverty line. A similar pattern is observed for the United
 
States, an allegedly more egalitarian society.
 
1These are taken from Fields (1977).
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FIGURE BRAZIL: SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, 1960 AND 1970
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(6) The poverty gap in Brazil was reduced by 41% between 1960 and
 
1970. The United States reduced its poverty gap by exactly the same
 
percentage over the same decade.
 
Although absolute incomes were growing and absolute poverty was
 
being alleviated, income disparities were widening. Overall measures
 
of inequality showed an increase. The Gini coefficient rose--from 
.59 to .63 in the economically active population, from .49 to .56 among
 
IAcome recipients. The rich got relatively richer, the income share
 
of the top 3.2% rising from 27% to 33%. Inequality also increased in
 
a number of other dimensions. Skill differentials widened; while incomes
 
of university graduates 
:ose by 52%, incomes of the primary educated
 
rose by only 14%. Occupationally, incomes of non-agricultural employers
 
and self-employed increased by 50%, incomes of non-agricultural employees
 
by 25%, and incomes of landless laborers not at all. Average income
 
rose by 32%, but the real minimum wage fell (by 25% between 1964 and
 
1970). Geographically, growth was concentrated disproportionately in
 
urban areas, industrial output growing by 96% over the decade as opposed
 
to 53% in agriculture. Regionally, some areas (particularly Sgo Paulo)
 
advanced rapidly while others (especially the Northeast) barely progressed
 
at all, resulting in an interregional per capita income gap of more than
 
four o one. Across all these dimensions, then, inequalities grew as
 
the economy grew.
 
Brazil's uneven economic growth is manifested in certain marked
 
changes in the employment structure. The occupations that grew were
 
relatively high level ones. Employment in primary occupations (defined
 
as agricultural activities, mining, forestry, and fishing) increased
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Table
 
BRAZIL: 
 SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
 
DURING THE 1960s
 
A. 	 Icome Source, 1970a
 
Wage earners as percentage of income
 
recipients 
 74%

Income 	received by wage-earners as
 percentage of total 
 71%
 
B. 	 Median Earned income by rural-ruban,
 
1960 (aDpro:*:mata)

Urban and suburban households 
 Cr$1,250

C. 	 Median Earned income by economic sector,
 
1970 (approximate)-

Industrial 
 NCr $195
 
Agriculture 
 110
All sectors 
 165
 
D. 	 (inMillions)d 1960 
 1970 Growth
 
Total 
 70.1 93.2 
 33%
Urban 
 32.5 52.1 60%
Rural 
 37.6 41.1 
 9%
 
E. 	 Real outnut by sector
 
1949 = 1--0
 industrial 
 261.4 511.8 
 96%
Agriculture 
 156.1 239.5 53%
Total real product 205.7 79%
368.5 

F. 	 Employment by sector(i'illions)l
 
Industrial 
 3.0 5.8 
 77%
Agriculture 
 12.2 13.1 
 9%
 
Total economically active
 
population 
 22.6 29.5 
 30%
 
G. 	 Emplovment by occunational 
type (in thouF;nnds)g
PrLimary: agri4cultural 12,271 12,533 2%
 
activities, mining,
 
forestry and fishing
 
continued
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Secondary: Mineral extraction, 
industrial production and 
services, and construction 2,791 5,476 96% 
Terciary: Professionals, sellers 
of services (including repairmen 
and domestic workers), merchants, 
transport and communication workers 
and civil servants (including police 
and army) 5,341 11,082 107% 
H. Rate of Emnlovment as percentage 
of population in Each Age-Sex 
Grupr 1960 1969 
Men 
15-19 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 + 
Men 15 and over 
72.4% 
92.3 
97.2 
96.9 
94.0 
83.2 
59.1 
88.6% 
68.2% 
89.3 
96.0 
95.8 
92.5 
81.5 
51.4 
84.8% 
Women 
15-19 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 + 
Women 15 and over 
23.4% 
22.5 
17.8 
.17.1 
15.6 
12.6 
8.5 
18.4% 
37.4% 
41.7 
36.3 
34.2 
31.0 
22.7 
10.0 
33.6% 
I. Ennlovment/outnut ratioby sector )! 1960 1968-70 % change 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
2.27 
.52 
.49 
2.50 
.63 
.68 
+10% 
+20% 
+38% 
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J. 	 Mean Monthlv Incomes. 1960 T:cr$ j
 
1970
 
1960 First 
August Quarter % Change 
Agricultural employees 	 2.6 2.5 -4% 
Non-agricultural employees 8.0 10.5 +31%
 
All employees 	 6.6 9.4 +43% 
Non-agricultural employers
 
and self-employed 14.0 19.5 +39%
 
K. 	 Changes in Relationship % change % change of 
Between Educaticn and the, of labor relative incomes 
Labor Markec. 196f-1970 force in that in that educa­
educational grouo tional groun
 
Primary 	 +5% -17%
 
Secondary 	 +96% - 7%
 
University 	 +79% +11%
 
Notes to Table
 
a) 	Comisi6n Economica para AmErica e) Fundacao Getdlio Vargas (1973), 
Latina (1974), p. 22 Table 2 
b) Brasil (1960), Table 6 f) Brasil (1970), Table V
 
c) Brasil (1970), Table 8 g) Singer (1971), Tables 2.V, 2.VI
 
d) Brasil (1960), Table 1 and h) Singer (1971), Table I.!
 
Brasil (1970), Table 1 i) Wogart (1974), Table 6 
j) Fishlow (1973b), p. 91 
k) Malan and Wells (1973), p. 1110 
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by just 2%; secondary activities (mineral extraction, industrial production
 
and services, and construction) grew by 96%; and tertiary employment
 
(professionals, sellers of services, merchants, transport and communica­
tion workers, and civil servants) increased by 107%. The urban labor
 
force grew six times as fast as the rural labor force, due to substantial
 
rural-urban migration. The educational composition of the labor force
 
shifted in favor of college graduates (+79%) as compared with a population
 
growth rate of 33%. Enrollments expanded at all levels; between 1960
 
and 1972, the number enrolled in primary schools increased by 100%, in
 
secondary schools by 250%, and in higher education by 350%. For the
 
most part public education is now free.
 
In recognizing these improvements, we should not forget the severe
 
economic conditions that remain. 20% of the Brazilian population received
 
incomes below $75 per capita in 1970. 
 More than 40% of the economically
 
active population continue to be engaged in primary activities. Of
 
those children who enter first grade, no more than 10% finish fourth
 
grade.
 
In short, the Brazilian economy presents a mixed picture. Aggregate
 
measures of growth and absolute income change look good but inequality
 
measures do not. The favored sectors grew larger, absorbing more and
 
more people. Those who were drawn into the enlarging modern sectors
 
or who moved up within them benefited handsomely. On the other hand,
 
whole sectors of the economy made little economic progress; consequently,
 
tens of millions of people experienced at best minor economic gains.
 
As compared with other countries, the Brazilian economy followed a highly
 
uneven growth path.
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Why did economic conditions in Brazil change as they did? Why
 
the unevenness? Experts on the Brazilian economy disagree strenuously
 
and often bitterly on a number of dimensions:
 
(1). Government industrialization and stabilization policy.
 
The Brazilian government instituted a number of fiscal and other
 
incentives to encourage industrialization and stabilize the economy while
 
pursuing an avowedly capitalistic course. Whether these policies act
 
as stimulants to growth of employment and incomes for the poor or as
 
a way of satisfying the demands of the rich for consumer durables produced
 
by multinational corporations is a key point of debate. Government
 
economists generally take the former position, known in some quarters
 
as the "trickle down" position; see, for example, Brazilian Trends
 
(1973). The consumer demand argument has a number of adherents, among
 
the most prominent of whom are Furtado (1970) and Singer (1977). A
 
third view is that government policy was directed toward a few while
 
disregarding the many; see, for example, the writings of Fishlow (1973a,
 
1973b).
 
(2) International trade policies.
 
A second issue is the impact of public policy with respect to
 
international trade. During the 1960s Brazil shifted toward an export­
promotion development strategy and away from a policy of import-substitu­
tion. In Brazil as in many other less developed countries, it is generally
 
thought that import-substitution was accompanied by factor price distor­
tions which hindered employment growth by favoring capital-intensive
 
techniques in manufacturing.1 The export-promotion phase, beginning
 
1But for a contrasting view of the labor absorption experience
 
during the import substitution phase, see Morley and Williamson (1974).
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in 1964, raised capital costs by means of monetary correction and lowered
 
labor costs via wage controls. The expected results---more labor-inten­
sive production---indeed took place. Whether or not these are
 
cause and effect is open to interpretation.
 
(3) Government wage policy.
 
We have observed that the Brazilian wage structure clearly widened
 
during the 1960s, both because wages in the relatively high-paying sectors
 
and occupations rose and because the real minimum wage fell. Some research­
ei- .ee this as cause and/or effect of rapid economic growth. Others
 
would adopt a less sanguine position, and hold that constant wages at
 
the bottom of the income distribution and rising wages elsewhere are
 
part of a more general governmental strategy aimed at minimizing express­
ions of worker discontent in order to maintain the existing economic
 
2
 
order.
 
(4) Educational Policy.
 
Langoni (1972,1975) contends that much of the increase in growth
 
and employment can be explained by increased-numbers of highly-educated
 
workers receiving higher wages due to their higher productivity. He
 
"Morley and Williamson (1975) argue that stability in the minimum
 
wage had the beneficial effect of stimulating employment of the unskilled;
 
thus growth is stimulated by a widening wage structure. Turning to the
 
effects of growth on wage dispersion, they state: "We have two conflict­
ing forces at work. Rapid growth employs the reserve army of the unskilled
 
thus fostering equality. Rapid growth also implies an unbalanced output 
growth which favors sectors requiring heavy doses of human and physical 
capital, thus fostering 'wage stretching' and inequality among the employed. 
Which dominates?" Their empirical estimates for Brazil lead them to conclude 
that ". . . the 'bulk' of the widening pay differentials among the employed 
is attributable to conventional market forces stemming from unbalanced 
output growth favoring those sectors which are intensive in skills and 
'
 machines rather than nonmarket wage control."
 
2See Mericle (1976).
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attributes growing relative income inequality in Brazil in large
 
part to the realization of quasi-rents by persons possessing scarce
 
human capital. Since he sees education as the cause of growth, Langoni's
 
main message is that "the simple workings of the development process
 
would, in the Brazilian situation, lead to an increase in income inequal­
ity". Furthermore, Langoni sees this as only temporary and anticipates 
a
 
reduction in inequality once the educational system and the labor market
 
have had time to respond to the sudden surge of growth. This interpreta­
tion has been challenged by Fishlow (1973a, 1973b), Malan and Wells
 
(1973), and Wells (1974) for a number of reasons including the following,
 
(i) The fact that income differentials between university graduates and
 
secondary graduates widened considerably over the decade (from 105% to
 
150%); (ii) The observation that average asocial rates of return are
 
found to be highest at the lowest educational levels, yet Brazilian
 
policy favors educational investment at the upper levels; and (iii) the
 
finding that education's explanatory power is considerably diminished
 
in the presence of occupational adjustments.
 
Could more have beer, done to ameliorate present-day povert:-? Undoubt­
edly. Why was more not done? 
 It depends whom you ask. Some students
 
of Brazilian political economy see the growth strategy adopted as being
 
in the direct interests of the ruling class. Adherents of this view
 
see the concentrated structure of ownership of the means of production
 
determining the structure of goods produced (largely consumer durables)
 
and the growth effort being aimed at creating a demand for those goods
 
on the part of the middle and upper classes. Others see it as being
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the result of a callous but economically defensible decision to augment
 
future productive capacity through current savings and investment at
 
the expense of anti-poverty efforts in this generation. Still others
 
point not to a pre-plauned strategy but to circumstances that arose
 
more or less independently, e.g., the availability of foreign loans
 
for factories and industrial equipment but not for potable water and
 
health clinics. On this view, the incentives were to grow unevenly
 
or not at all, and uneven growth was the outcome.
 
Which view is right? All have elements of truth. I would suggest
 
that Brazilian policy was characterized by inattention to the short­
run poverty problem. Call it benign neglect or heartless exploitation
 
according to your emotive valuation. Whatever you call the pattern of
 
Brazilian growth, the deliberate unevenness is its central feature.
 
1
 
THE PHILIPPINES'
 
The Philippines ranks in the middle of the income scale of the
 
developing countries: in 1969 its per capita GDP was about U.S. $250.
 
However, its overall growth performance is well above average. Real GNP
 
more than tripled between 1950 and 1973, the date of the most recent
 
distribution statistics. This implies a growth rate of 6% per year
 
(compounded) in real output and 3% per year in real output per capita,
 
broken down by subperiods as follows:
 
Average Annual Real Growth Rate
 
Years Gross Domestic Product GDP per Capita
 
3.2%
1950 - 1960 6.4% 

2.1
1960 - 1965 5.1 

2.7
1965 - 1973 5.8 

and only Taiwan and Costa Rica among the
Few countries in the world ---

--- have done better.
countries studied in this paper 

Before trying to discover who benefited from the Philippines'
 
growth, we should note the apparent dualism of the Philippine economy.
 
Post-war economic growth followed quite different ..
ourses in the two
 
major economic divigions. In the rural sector, where 70% of the people
 
Altogether the agricultural sector
 are located, little has changed. 

has grown slowly (about 3% per year in real terms) but steadily. None­
theless, food is still produced using methods similar to those of
 
previous generations. Non-agricultural rural activities (e.g., cottage
 
industries, small scale commerce) have not surfaced to any appreciable
 
any studies of Philippine economic development have been under­
taken. Among the most useful are those by the ILO (1974), Cheetham
 
and Hawkins (1976), and Averch &t al. (1971).
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extent, nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future. In contrast
 
to the rural situation, the urban economy developed more rapidly but less
 
evenly. Organized manufacturing in particular grew quickly at first
 
(more than 10% real growth per annum in the 1950s). Growth has slowed
 
in the last decade, but real manufacturing production still grew at
 
a 6% annual rate from 1965 to 1973.
 
These overall growth figures conceal great diversity of experience.
 
The report of the ILO Mission to the Philippines goes so far as 
to
 
say (pp. 4-5): "The Philippine economy provides a striking example 
of the inadequacy of conventional aggregate criteria of economic growth
 
both to judge past development performance and to appreciate future
 
prospects." More disaggregated income distribution data are avail­
able and they exhibit a deeply disturbing pattern: despite a tripling
 
of the national product and a doubling of national product per capita,
 
mean family incomes grew by less than 1% per year. 
We see in Table
 
that mean income evaluated at constant prices went from an index
 
value of 100 in 1956 to 
a high of 126 in 1.965 and then down to 117
 
in 1971. 1 
 Evidence like this led the ILO Mission to characterize the
 
postwar period as one of "narrow participation and unbalanced growth"
 
and other authors to regard Philippine development as a "crisis of
 
'2
 
ambiguity.
 
Other social indicators also suggest little success in distri­
buting the benefits of growth in the Philippines. A good example is
 
IPresumably the figure is even lower today due to recent economic
 
difficulties and the consequent negative rates of growth.
 
2Averch et al.(1971).
 
Table 
The Philippines: 
Income Distribution Data, 1956 
- 1971.
 
Indicator 1956 
 1961 1965 1971 
Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban 
Quintile offamilies (percentage of
 
totalfamily income)
Lowest 20 per cent 4.5 7.0 4.5 4.2 5.9 3.8 3.5 5.0 3.8 3.8 4.4Second 20 per cent 4.68.1 11.1 8.0 7.9 11.8 7.5Third 20 per cent 12.4 14.7 12.2 8.0 9.5 8.0 8.1 8.9 9.412.1 13.5 12.5 12.8 15.3 12.0Fourth 20 per cent 13.2 13.9 13.419.8 21.1 20.0 19.3 21.9 19.5 20.2 23.0Top 20 per cent 18.7 21.1 21.8 21.955.1 46.1 55.3 56.4 46.9 57.1 55.4 47.2 57.5 53.9 51.0Top 10 per cent 50.739.4 30.1 39.6 41.0 31.1 40.9 40.0 30.0 41.7Top 5 per cent 36.9 34.4 33.427.7 29.0 28.7 24.3 22.6 22.6Index of quintile inequality 0.44 0.34 0.44 0.46 0.36 0.46 0.45 0.38 0.47 0.40 0.41Gini coefficient 0.410.48 0.38 0.49 0.50 0.40 0.52 0.51 0.42 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.45AMean income (current pesos) 1471 989 2427 1804 1203 2970 2541 1 755 4405 3736 2 818Index, current price 5867100 100 100 123 123 123 173 178 182 254Index. constant price 100 100 100 111 285 242 110 111 126 130 133 117 132 111Mean urban income/mean rural 
income 2.45 2.47 2.51 2.08 
Source: ILO (1974, Table 3).
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nutrition. The World Bank reports that just after World War II the
 
Philippines was comparable in nutritional status to Malaysia,
 
Japan, and Taiwan. Various studies estimate that there are serious
 
nutritional deficiencies for about 40-45% of the population, though
 
some estimates are even higher. 
 Clearly, the Philippines has
 
lagged behind her neighbors in providing basic needs for her people.
 
Let us look at relative inequality. Data on nominal incomes by
 
quintile group are presented in Table 
 We see that the three
 
middle quintiles gained relatively as compared with the richest and
 
poorest qiintiles. This means that the Lorenz curves for the two years
 
necessarily cross and summary measures of relative inequality will
 
not always agree; so for example the Gini coefficient of inequality
 
showed a small decline between 1961 and 1971 while another index of
 
inequality, the ratio of income of the top quintile to the bottom
 
quintile, was found to increase 
over the same time.
 
What about absolute poverty? The data in Table are based on 
nominal incomes, unadjusted for inflation. Using the change in the 
Consumer Price Index (+101.6%) as an approximation to the inflation 
experienced by the poor, it follows that the average real incomes of
 
the poorest percentile groups fell.
 
Is the falling real income in the lowest quintile evidace of
 
absolute impoverishment in the Philippines? Before drawing that conclu­
sion from decile data alone, we ought to examine occupation or industry-

ISee Cheetham and Hawkins (1976, Chapter 11).
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Table
 
The Philippines: Average Income Per Family
 
In Current Pesos, 1961 and 1971.
 
Mean in Current Pesos
 
Nominal
 
Quintile Group 1961 1971 Growth'*
 
Lowest 
 383 687 + 79%
 
Second 712 
 1523 +114%
 
Third 
 1090 2470 +127%
 
Fourth 1738 
 3924 +126%
 
Fifth 5094 10079 + 98%
 
The Consumer Price Index rose by 101.6% over that period.
 
[Source: Mijares and Belarmino (1973).]
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specific wages or incomes. In the case of the Philippines,
 
the data show that incomes in constant pesos declined
 
for many groups: salaried employees, wage earners, and skilled and
 
unskilled industrial laborers; see Table . In agriculture the
 
picture looks little better: real agricultural wages seem not to
 
have risen in the postwar period but real earnings of households headed
 
by farm laborers were about 20% higher in 1971 than in 1965
 
There is one other possible way in which the poor might have been
 
made better off. Elementary economic theory suggests that falling
 
wages would induce employers to hire more workers. Either these persons
 
will have been unemployed and receiving no income at all or they will be
 
attracted from even lower-paying activities. Thus, the poor may share in
 
economic development by becoming employed in large numbers in expanding 
modern sector jobs which offer relatively advantageous conditions, for
 
example, in skilled occupations, high-paying industries, or in wage and
 
salary jobs more generally. Data on the changing industrial and occupa­
tional composition of the Philippine labor force are given in Tables
 
and The signs are not encouraging. Total employment expanded by
 
4,900,000 between 1956 and 1972. Nearly half the growth took place in
 
agriculture (2,300,000). Of the rest, the occupational breakdown reveals
 
large gains in sales and clerical jobs (1,000,000) and in professional
 
employment (400,000), neither of which would be expected to benefit
 
the poor very much. By industry grouping, employment gains were large
 
in commerce and in domestic and personal services (1,100,000). Manufactur­
ing employment, in contrast, expanded by only 400,000. It seems fair
 
1 ILO (1974, pp. 11 and 60). 
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Table 
The Philippines: Average Incomes for Select Groups. 
Index of Average Monthly 
Earnings, Nominal Pesos 
(19 65 =100)a) 
Salaried Employees 
Wage Earners 
1957 
76.2 
78.9 
1961 
90.8 
88.1 
1965 
100.0 
100.0 
1971 
132.3 
142.1 
1975 
190.2 
215.3 
Index of Average Monthly 
Earnings, Constant Pesos 
(1965 =100)a),b) 
Salaried Employees 
Wage Earners 
Index of Wage Rates for 
Laborers in Industrial 
Establishments in Manila 
105.8 
109.6 
113.8 
110.4 
100.0 
100.0 
82.6 
88.7. 
65.1 
73.7 
and Suburbs (1 9 6 5 = 1 0 0 )c) 
Skilled Laborers 
Unskilled Laborers 
117.5 
110.2 
115.7 
104.8 
100.0 
100.0 
91.3 
101.3 
62.5 
69.6 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Source: 
Source: 
Source: 
Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical 
Bulletin (1975, Table 140) 
Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical 
Bulletin (1975, Table 138) 
Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical 
Bulletin (1975, Table 141) 
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Table
 
The Philippines: Employed Persons by Major Industry Group,
 
Selected Years, in Thousands. 
October, October, October, November, 
1956a) 1961a) 1965a) 1972b) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Hunting and Fishing 4,548 
(59.0%) 
5,514 
(60.6%) 
5,725 
(56.7%) 
6,863 
(54.5%) 
Mining and Quarrying 31 31 24 36 
(0.4%) (0.3%) (0.2%) (0.3%) 
Construction 198 230 295 432 
(2.6%) (2.5%) (2.9%) (3.4%) 
Manufacturing 962 
(12.5%) 
1,026 
(11.3%) 
1,101 
(10.9%) 
1,323 
(10.5%) 
Electricity, Gas, Water, 
and Sanitary Services 2[ 19 22 44 
(0.3%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.3%) 
Commerce 803 873 1,114 1,478 
(10.4%) (9.6%) (11.0%) (11.7%) 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 228 278 339 467 
(3.0%) (3.1%) (3.4%) (3.7%) 
Government, Community, 
Business and Recreational 
Services 392 538 708 1,071 
(5.1%) (5.9%) (7.0%) (8.5%) 
Domestic Services 332 368 500 617 
(4.3%) (4.0%) (5.0%) (4.9%) 
Personal Services Other 
than Domestic 135 179 227 246 
(1.8%) (2.0%) (2.2%) (2.0%) 
Industry Not Reported 47 39 47 4 
(0.6%) (0.4%) (0.5%) (0.03%) 
Total Employment 7,702 9,095 10,101 12,582 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Sources: a) Statistical Handbook of the Philippines (1971, Table 111.4).
 
b) Statistical Handbook of the Philippines (1976, Table 61).
 
Table 62
 
The Philippines: Employed Persons by Major Occupation Group,
 
Selected Years, in Thousands.
 
October, October, October, 

a ) )
1956 1961 a
 196 5a) 

Professional, Technical, and
 
Related Workers 216 309 375 

(2.8%) (3.4%) (3.7%) 

Proprietors, Managers, Adminis­
trators and Officials 352 340 432 

(4.6%) (3.7Z) (4.3%) 

Clerical, Office and Related
 
Workers 153 273 352 

(2.0%) (3.0%) (3.5%) 

Salesmen and Related Workers 456 537 675 

(5.9%) (5.9%) (6.7%) 

Farmers, Farm Laborers, Fishermen,
 
Hunters, Lumbermen & Related
 
Workers 4,525 5,501 5,677 

(58.8%) (60.5%) (56.2%) 

Workers in Mine, Quarry and
 
Related Occupations 30 23 14 

(0.4%) (0.2%) (0.1%) 

Workers in Operating Transport
 
Occupations 145 184 272 

(1.9%) (2.0%) (2.7%) 

Craftsmen, Factory Operatives, and
 
Workers in Related Occupations 1,071 1,100 1,270 

(13.9%) (12.1%) (12.6%) 

Manual Workers and Laborers, N.E.C. 171 168 151 

(2.2%) (1.8%) (1.5%) 

Service and Related Workers 541 636 840 

(7.0%) (7.0%) (8.3%) 

Occupation Not Reported 41 29 42 

(0.5%) (0.3%) (0.4%) 

Total Employment 	 7,702 9,095 10,101 

(100%) (100%) (100%) 

November,
 
19 72b)
 
595
 
(4.7%)
 
136
 
(1.1%)
 
457
 
(3.6%)
 
1,314
 
(10.4%)
 
6,829
 
(54.3%)
 
20
 
(0.2%)
 
507
 
(4.0%)
 
1,471
 
(11.7%)
 
226
 
(1.8%)
 
1,019
 
(8.1%)
 
7
 
(0.06%)
 
12,582
 
(100%)
 
Sources: a) Statistical Handbook of the Philippines (1971, Table 111.5).
 
b) Statistical Handbook of the Philippines (1976, Table 62).
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to conclude from this evidence that movement of workers into modern sector
 
employment was not a major aspect of economic growth in the Philippines.
 
We have encountered a lower average absolute income in the poorest
 
quintile, falling or stagnant wages and incomes for major occupational
 
groups, and small increases in employment in job categories likely to
 
benefit low income persons. The apparent conclusion: the poor in the
 
Philippines did not participate much in economic growth, rather they
 
are absolutely poorer.This is a disturbing result whenever it is encounter­
ed. When impoverishment is found in a rapidly-growing economy, it is
 
all the more distressing.
 
What development strategies and policies led the Philippines to
 
alleviate poverty so little while growing so much? The obvious answer
 
is a political one: successive regimes in the Philippines did not take
 
direct measures to spread the benefits of growth. They seem to have
 
hoped that the benefits would filter down to the poor through multi­
plier effects, forward and backward linkages, and changing internal terms
 
of trade. The Philippine economy is a clear example of how so-called
 
"trickle down growth strategies" can go awry when accompanied by dis­
equalizing policies that favor a select few.
 
The Philippines has rightly been classified as a labor abundant
 
economy. In such an economy, we would expect that the encouragement of
 
labor-intensive production methods would both enhance growth and increase
 
the economic participation of the poor. But this was not the course
 
followed. Instead, the macroeconomic policy measures in force since the
 
early 1950s (overvalued exchange rates, artificially low interest rates, 
64
 
investment subsidies) have created incentives for excessive capital­
intensity in production and for imports of consumer goods and raw
 
materials. The manufacturing sector has fallen behind the rest of the
 
economy, in terms of both employment and output. This has placed increas­
ing burdens on the agricultural sector to support economic growth,
 
which it has been unable to do. Rural inequality has increased steadily.
 
Although the Philippines extended the acreage under cultivation and
 
introduced high-yielding varieties of rice, participation in these
 
improvements was limited. The barriers to full participation include
 
the unavailability of credit for small farmers, lack of access to modern
 
inputs, an underdeveloped transport and marketing network, and limited
 
irrigation facilities. Even in the rural areas, public irLvestment projects
 
tend to be large and to favor those individuals already in an advanta­
geous position.
 
Public policy clearly favors urban concentration. Some 80% of
 
industrial activity in the Philippines is located in Manila. Industries
 
benefit from favorable energy distribution and rates and other fiscal
 
incentives, provided they locate in Manila. In marked contrast to,
 
say, Taiwan, in the Philippines, rural industrialization receives little
 
public support.
 
One other indication of the narrowness of development strategy
 
in the Philippines is the change in the functional distribution of income.
 
Because of a substantial increase in the share of undistributed corporate
 
profits (from 10% of national income in 1961 to 16% in 1971), the function­
al distribution shifted away from the household sector. This implies a
 
gain for the relatively well-to-do, since non-employment incomes are
 
concentrated in few hands (see Table
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Table
 
The Philippines: Percentage Distribution of Families
 
By Main Source of Income, 1971.
 
Agriculture
 
Wages and salaries 10.7%
 
Farming 34.4
 
Fishing, forestry, and hunting 4.3
 
49.4%
 
Non-agriculture
 
Wages and salaries 32.3%
 
Entrepreneurial activities 12.3
 
44.6%
 
Other 6.0%
 
Total 100.0% 
[Source: ILO (1974, Table 117).]
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The lesson from the Philippines is a clear one. The ILO report
 
puts it well: "Not every type of growth, regardless of its rapidity,
 
is sufficient in itself to ensure a matching of over-all supply and
 
demand." It is, rather, the kind of economic growth that may prove
 
decisive in determining the extent to which the poor participate in
 
economic development. This is a matter of policy, not nature.
 
Certainly, shortages of natural resources may seriously constrain
 
the range of possibilities. But whatever the resource endowments
 
may be, political will may well be decisive for the fate of the poor.
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TAIWAN
 
Taiwan is in the admirable position of combining rapid economic
 
growth, sharply-reduced inequality, and widespread alleviation of 
poverty. As such, it is both the only country in our sample and one 
of the very few low income countries in the world to be developing so
 
rapidly. 
We begin our study of Taiwan in the early 1950s, shortly after the
 
move from the Mainland. During the 1950s, real Gross National Product 
per capita grew by around 3% per year despite rapid population growth.
 
The first income distribution data were published for 1953 and the
 
second for 1961. These data give the impression of declining inequali­
ty, but these estimates ought not to be taken seriously, because the
 
1953 data were based on fitted rather than actual incomes and they are
 
constructed from a sample of only 300 households selected non-randomly.
 
The first reliable income distribution data for Taiwan become availa­
ble only in the 1960s, and even then, the accuracy of tdhe data from
 
the early 1960s is subject to doubt.
 
Since 1964, Surveys of Family Income and Expenditure have been
 
conducted regularly. To date, the surveys through 1972 have been
 
published and analyzed. Data from these surveys are shown in Table
 
Row (1)of the table indicates that per household income nearly
 
doubled in real terms between 1964 and 1972. This remarkable growth
 
performance is well-known. Less well-known are the distributional
 
aspects of that growth. These are reported in rows (2)- (6). We
 
see in rows (2)and (3) that two measures of relative inequality--­
the Cini coefficient and the ratio of incomes of the top decile to
 
68 
Table
 
Taiwan: Income Distribution, 1964 & 1972.
 
Rate of Increase, 
1964 1972 1964-72 (%) 
(1) Mean income per household
 
at constant 1972 prices,
 
measured in thousands of NT$ 32.5 61.0 + 88%
 
(2) Gini coefficient 0.328 0.301 - 9%
 
(3) Ratio of income share
 
of top 10% to bottom 10% 8.6 6.8 - 21%
 
(4) Income share of poorest 20% 7.7% 8.6% + 12%
 
(5) Mean income at 1972 constant
 
prices
 
(in thousands of NT$):
 
First decile (lowest) NT$ 9.9 ('000) NT$ 20.6 ('000) +109%
 
Second " 15.2 30.2 + 98% 
Third " 18.9 .36.1 + 91% 
Fourth " 22.0 41.1 + 87% 
Fifth " 25.3 46.2 + 83%
 
Sixth " 28.5 52.1 
 + 83% 
Seventh " 32.9 59.6 + 81% 
Eighth " 38.7 69.0 + 78%
 
Ninth " 48.8 83.4 + 71% 
Tenth " 128.884.5 + 53%
 
(6) Proportion of households
 
with incomes below specified
 
amount (in thousands of
 
constant NT$)in specified
 
year:
 
NT$20 35% 10%
 
30 55% 20%
 
40 80% 35%
 
Sources: Kuo (1975, Tables 5 and 6) and Fei-Kuo-Ranis (1978, Diagram 1).
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the bottom decile---both declined, the latter more than the former.
 
1 
Other measures of inequality also fell over the period. Rows (4)
 
and (5) present the absolute real incomes of various decile groups.
 
We see that the income share of the poorest decile increased, which in
 
a rapidly-growing economy implies even more rapidly-growing incomes among
 
the very poorest. A comparison of the rates of growth of real incomes
 
by decile grouping (row (5)) shows a clear patter: highest rates of
 
income growth at the lowest end of the income distribution. These
 
decile shares are translated into absolute puverty data in row (6). The
 
record of achievement is extraordinary: in just eight years, Taiwan
 
alleviated absolute poverty among the majority of its poor. As far
 
as I know, no other country in the world has accomplished that.
 
How do we account for the decline in inequality and poverty ln
 
Taiwan? Let us first consider proximate causes. Data on functional
 
income distribution reveal a clear shift in favor of labor income and
 
an almost equw. reduction in the importance of agricultural income:
 
Functional Functional Functional 
Income Share, Share, 
Grouping 1964 1972 
Wage Income .432 .590 
Agricultural Income .275 .103 
Property Income .240 .258 
Other Income .053 .049 
Total 1.000 1.000 
[Source: Fei, Kuo, and Ranis (1978 Diagram 1)]
 
1Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1977) note that most of the change took
 
place after 1968, which marked the end of the labor surplus.
 
70 
This shift has two important implications. One is that because
 
wage income is distributed more evenly than is agricultural income,
 
the rising importance of labor income is likely to reduce inequality
 
in the economy as a whole. Second, since wages are higher on average
 
than agricultural incomes, if the wage income share increased and
 
the agricultural income share declined while inequality was falling,
 
it must be because the population shifted from agriculture to the
 
wage sector. Indeed, the data in Table show Just that: a
 
large decline in the share of labor force employed in agriculture,
 
a corresponding gain in the share in industry, and virtual constancy
 
of service's share. Taiwan's ability to create sufficient industrial
 
jobs for the workers released from agriculture contrasts with the
 
experience in most LDCs of growing underemployment in low-level
 
jobs, especially in the cities, in areas like commerce and services.
 
Another indication of labor -force upgrading in Taiwan is the
 
distribution of the labor force by occupational position. Let us
 
divide the economically active population into three groups---wage
 
employees, own account workers, and unpaid family workers; see Table
 
We find that the proportion of paid employees rose from 40% to 60%
 
in thirteen years, the fraction of unpaid family workers fell nearly
 
in half, and the proportion of own account workers fell also.
 
This means that commercialization and industrialization were proceeding
 
rapidly enough to draw more and more of the work force into modern
 
sectors.
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Table
 
Taiwan: Sectoral Distribution of Employment, Various Years.
 
Mining, manu­Pre-1966 Agriculture, facturing,
 
Classification forestry, transport, All other
 
System 
 fishing communications industries
 
Number Number 
 Number
('000) 
_ ('000) L P000) 
1953 1812 61.3% 339 11.5% 803 27.2%
 
1958 
 1813 57.0 435 13.7% 930 29.3
 
1964 2010 54.2 15.0
556 1144 30.8
 
1966 2050 53.0 
 604 15.6 1216 31.4
 
Post-1966 Agriculture Industry Services
 
Classification Number 
 sNumber Number
 
System ('000) % ('000) 
 % ('009) % 
1966 1617 43.5% 1050 28.2% 
 1055 28.3%
 
1972 1632 33.0 1847 37.3 1469 
 29.7
 
1975 1652 29.9 
 2276 41.2 1593 28.9
 
Source: Galenson (1977, Tables 2 and 3).
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The upgrading of employment in favor of higher-income jobs is
 
shown in occupational data; see Table , columns (1) and (2). The
 
fraction of workers employed as managers and professionals increased
 
from 2.3% of the labor force in 1964 to 11.1% in 1972---a fivefold
 
increase. Salaried workers and owners of small firms also became
 
relative3y more numerous. The occupational groups that diminished in
 
importance were the lowest-paying ones---farmers and laborers.
 
This shift in the occupational distribution toward the upper end is
 
evidence of substantial modern sector enlargement.
 
Where Taiwan differs from other countries is in the pattern of 
income change by occupation; see columns (3) - (5) of Table 
Incomes in the lowest occupational categories grew considerably. 
Farmers' incomes rose by 53% in eight years and latirers' incomes by 
123%. Ths, those who remained in low-level occupations shared in 
economic growth, their combined incomes rising at a faster rate than
 
the combined incomes of managers and professionals. This is evidence
 
of substantial traditional sector enrichment, both absolutely and
 
relatively, on a scale unequaled in any of the other countries studied.
 
In summary: "All these indicators point to the conclusion that
 
rapid economic growth has led to a marked improvement in Taiwan's
 
employment situation, without any radical redistribution of income
 
or wealth. This is not to say that full employment has been achieved
 
in Taiwan, any more than it has in the industrial market economies.
 
But Taiwan has clearly left the stage of gross unemployment that still
 
characterizes most of the developing world."'
 
iGalenson (1977, pp. 31-32).
 
73 
Table
 
Taiwan: Occupational Position of the Labor Force,
 
Various Years
 
Year 
1964. 1968 1972 1975 
Paid Employees 41i7% 50.6% 57.8% 59.8% 
Own Account Workers 29.8 26.9 25.4 24.3 
Unpaid Family Workers 28.5 22.5 16.8 15.9 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
[Source: Galenson (1977, Table 14)]
 
Table
 
Taiwan: Income and Employment by Occupational Group, 1964 & 1972.
 
(1) 	 (2) C') (4) (5) 
Percentage Average Income Average Income 
Change in per family, in that occupa- Growth rateanf 
Share of Employment thousands of tion relative Average Income
 
Employment Share NT$ (constant) to the mean in occupation
 
Occupetion 	 1964 1972 1964-72 1964 1972 1964 1972 1964-72
 
Managers 1.4% 3.8% +171% NT$87 NT$116 2.69 1.92 + 33%
 
Professionals 0.9 7.3 +711 48 83 1.46 1.40 + 74
 
Owner of Small Firms 11.1 12.8 + 15 39 67 1.20 1.10 + 69
 
Salaried Workers 17.9 21.0 + 17 
 38 66 1.25 1.10 + 74
 
Farmers 39.6 25.9 - 35 32 49 .99 .81 + 53
 
Laborers 27.3 22.8 - 17 24 54 .74 .88 +123
 
Other Industries 1.8 6.4 +255 20 41 .61 .68 +110
 
Whole Economy 100.0% 100.0% - NT$32 NT$61 - -	 + 87 
Source: Kuo (1975, 'fable15).
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What sorts of structural changes in Taiwan's economy accompan­
ied these shifts? We may identify the following factors in Taiwan's
 
growth since the early 1950s: gains in agricultural labor productiv­
ity of nearly 250%, which financed rapid growth, industrialization,
 
and reallocation of the labor force out of agriculture; growing external
 
orientation of the economy, industrial exports increasing fourteen­
fold; changing export composition, shifting from primarily agricultural
 
goods to over 90% industrial; investment in labor-intensive industries
 
including electrical machinery, chemicals, and textiles; end of the
 
labor surplus around 1965, followed by rising wage shares in national
 
income; and high and growing rural industrialization. For further
 
analysis of Taiwan's growth experience, see Fei and Ranis -(1975) and
 
Galenson (forthcoming).
 
What kinds of economic development policies and strategies
 
produced these outcomes? There are four key elements:
 
(1) Strategy of Decentralized Development.
 
Taiwan inherited from colonial days the start of a network of
 
roads, railways, irrigation systems, and industrial estates. Farmers'
 
organizations and agricultural extension services were also in place.
 
After independence, Taiwan not only maintained these decentralized
 
systems but also continued their development and added to them (e.g.,
 
rural electrification). As one indicator of the extent of decentral­
ized development, we have the fact that in the Fifties and Sixties
 
there were more new rural than urban business establishments in Taiwan.
 
Another is the fact that the maj6rity of Taiwan's industrial workers
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are in rural areas, the proportion increasing steadily. Taiwan's
 
strategy of early attention to backward areas contrasts with most
 
other countries' emphasis on urban growth: developing industrial
 
complexes, building housing, and supplying physical and social services
 
in the major cities. One consequence of decentralized development
 
was the unusually low rate of rural-urban migration experienced in
 
Taiwan.
 
(2) Balanced Rural Development Strategy.
 
The development of rural Taiwan combined the standard concern
 
with agriculture with unusually heavy attention to non-agricultural
 
activities. In most less developed countries, ninety percent or more
 
of the economically active rural population is employed in agriculture;
 
in Taiwan, the percentage is more like fifty percent. This is seen
 
as providing the goods and services needed to make rural growth
 
viable and preventing the rapid urbanization via rural-urban migration
 
which is found in most other low income countris. It should be
 
recognized that this did not come about through happenstance. Taiwan
 
made major efforts toward agriculttral development. Land reform was
 
a key ingredient. Between 1949 and 1953, Taiwan compelled the sale
 
of land by landlords, sold public lands for cultivation, and imposed
 
rent controls. Institutional structures were reorganized in support of
 
land reform, including such measures as agricultural research and
 
extension programs, farmers' cooperatives for purchasing and marketing,
 
and credit to small farmers. Roads and other physical infrastructure
 
were maintained and expanded.
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(3). Industrial and Trade Strategies.
 
Around 1960, Taiwan made a major change in its policies toward
 
industrialization and trade. Before then, heavy reliance was placed
 
on import substitution. The policies of import substitution included
 
high tariffs to protect domestic industries, over-valued exchange
 
rates, artificially low domestic interest rates, and other measures
 
aimed at increasing production at home of goods that used to be imported.
 
This can go on only so long before the domestic market is satisfied
 
and the additional goods must be exported. Around 1960, therefore,
 
Taiwan switched to a policy of export promotion, i.e., encouraging
 
the production of goods for export and their sale in world markets.
 
Exchange rates were made realistic, interest rates were reformed, and
 
barriers to trade were reduced. In short, the policy was to rely on
 
market prices, lessening distortions of relative prices and technologies,.
 
and avoiding premature capital-intensity. The outcome, it is argued,
 
is "the embodiment of labor service in export to the world market.
 
conducive to both rapid growth and full employment" and to the alleviation
 
of poverty and reduction in inequality due to the absorption of the
 
1
 
new activities.
poor in 

(4) Human Resource Development.
 
For a country at its stage of development, Taiwan has invested
 
exceptionally large sums from her own resources in education. At the
 
upper levels, enrollments in higher education increased sixfold from
 
44,000 in 1962 to 282,000 in 1974. The increased supply of highly­
educated workers may have permitted, or even caused, the growth of
 
employment in high-level occupations. At the lower levels, six grades
 
iThe quotation is from Fei and Ranis (1975, p. 52). The more
 
general theme it developed in Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1977, Chapter Two).
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of primary education have been compulsory and free for a decade and
 
School attendance ratios are approaching 100% among children
 a half. 

six to twelve. At the intermediate level, three additional years
 
The educational
of free education have been available since 1968. 

composition of the labor force at present is as follows:
 
Number 
Educational Level ('000) Percentage. 
Illiterate 581 11% 
Self-educated 228 4 
Primary school 2,613 48 
Secondary 1,683 31 
Higher 369 7 
Total 5,475 101% 
[Source: Galenson (1977, Table 10)].
 
This is a particularly well-educated populace for a country as poor
 
as Taiwan. Many would regard Taiwan's investments in education and
 
important
the consequent high skill level of the labor force as 

factors contributing to both the modern sector enlargement and the
 
traditional sector enrichment components of Taiwan's rapid economic
 
growth.
 
Are Taiwan's policies and strategies applicable to other countries?
 
Taiwan's economic gains are sometimes thought to be something of a
 
special case due to particular advantages: uniform geography and
 
culture, rich human resources, a rural orientation during colonial
 
development in the past, or a special relationship with the U.S. at
 
present. But, as Ranis (1977) reminds us, Taiwan also has had some
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particular disadvantages: poor natural resource endowment, scarcity
 
of land, political upheavals at time of birth, quota restrictions
 
on a key export (textiles), and the drain of high military spending.
 
How these advantages and disadvantages balance out as compared with
 
the "typical" developing country is anybody's guess.
 
Taiwan's development success ----and indeed it is a success in
 
terms of poverty, inequality, and overall growth --- offers lessons
 
for other countries. First, there can be little doubt of Taiwan's
 
commitment to developing for the benefit of all her people. Having
 
established broad-based development as a central goal of society,
 
some tough decisions were taken in support of that goal --- in particu­
lar, land reform and reliance on market prices, both of which were
 
opposed by powerful and vocal special interests. In other countries
 
which may lack a fitm commitment to development for everyone and the
 
courage to act on that commitment, it seems only natural that their
 
economic systems will perpetuate the flow of resources to the haves
 
with at best some trickle-down to the have-nots.
 
A second lesson from the Taiwanese experience is that a broad­
based development strategy can lead to economic well-being of the
 
masses within a generation. Most countries concentrate on expanding
 
a small modern sector with the intention of redistributing some of
 
the proceeds after the fact. It may take a century until everyone is
 
raised above a basic poverty level. Taiwan, in contrast, chose to
 
develop all major sectors (agriculture and rural industry as well as
 
the urban economy) gradually and evenly. This strategy of balanced
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economic growth may hold considerable promise for other less developed
 
countries where diminishing returns in leading sectors may have set in.
 
Third, ar.- commitment no matter how resolute or any strategy
 
no matter how well-conceived in its broad outlines will be doomed to
 
failure if specific policy changes are made in the wrong direction
 
or at the wrong time. Consider Taiwan's changed trade strategy.
 
The lesson is not that export promotion is always better and that
 
import-substituting countries can never succeed. Rather, we should
 
conclude that the shift from the import substitution to export
 
promotion is an example of the right policy being pursued at the
 
right time in response to changing conditions (generated in this
 
case internally). No one policy is right once and for all.
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CONCLUSIONS
 
This paper has explored the progress and commitment of six less
 
developed countries in increasing the participation of the poor in
 
economic development. Both absolute poverty and relative inequality
 
measures were used. At issue is a fundamental question: what combina­
tions of circumstances and policies led some countries to upgrade the
 
economic positions of their poor at faster rates than others? The main
 
results are as follows.
 
(1) Absolute poverty was alleviated in some countries but not in
 
others. The proportion with incomes below a basic minimum level declined
 
substantially in Taiwan, Sri Lanka, and Costa Rica. Brazil alleviated
 
its absolute poverty by raising the average incomes of those who remained
 
poor. Absolute poverty was not ameliorated in the Philippines or India:
 
poverty increased noticeably in both countries.
 
(2) Relative inequality increased in some countries and declined
 
in others. Large increases in inequality took place in the Philippines
 
and Brazil. On the other hand, large declines in inequality were found
 
for Sri Lanka and Costa Rica. Small inequality declines were reported
 
in Taiwan and India.
 
(3) The absolute poverty and relative inequality measures agree in
 
some cases and disagree in others. Qualitative agreement arises in four
 
countries. In three of these (Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, and Taiwan) both
 
poverty and inequality declined, while in a fourth (the Philippines) both
 
increased. But in two cases, the absolute poverty and relative inequalit:
 
measures are in conflict. In Brazil, although relative inequality
 
increased, absolute poverty was alleviated., A reverse pattern is found
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in India. There, relative inequality showed a slight decline, yet
 
absolute poverty rose substantially. These results suggest that the
 
choice of an absolute poverty or relative inequality measure may make
 
an important difference in assessing the participation of the poor in
 
economic development. Economists and others evaluating development
 
performances should choose that type of measure which accords most
 
closely with the value judgments they wish to make.
 
(4) A high aggregate Srowth rate is neither necessary nor sufficient
 
for reducing absolute poverty. Included in our sample were both fast
 
and slow growing countries. Their poverty performances are given in the
 
ollowing table:
 
Table
 
Six Countries: Growth and Poverty Change 
GROWTH 
HIGH LOW 
INCREASING Philippines India 
DECREASING Taiwan Sri Lanka 
Costa Rica 
Brazil 
Two deviant cases stand out---the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The
 
Philippines grew rapidly, yet the proportion poor increased. On the
 
other hand, Sri Lanka grew very slowly, yet absolute poverty was substan­
tially reduced. In both countries the outcome is clearly linked to
 
public policy---welfare statism as part of a large scale anti-poverty
 
campaign in Sri Lanka, virtual inattention to -he poverty problem in the
 
Philippines.
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(5) A high aggregate growth rate is neither necessary nor sufficient
 
for reducing relative inequality, as shown in the following table:
 
Table
 
Six Countries: Growth and Ineauality Change
 
GROWTH 
HIGH LOW 
INCREASING Philippines 
HBrazil 
01 
DECREASING 	 Costa Rica Sri Lanka
 
Taiwan India
 
The two fastest growing countries---Taiwan and Costa Rica--­
experienced declining inequality, as did the two slowest prowing countries
 
---Sri Lanka and India. These four countries pursued development
 
strategies in 	which rural development figured heavily. Inequality
 
increased in the two countries with high but not spectacular growth
 
rates----the Philippines and Brazil. 
Both these countries followed
 
uneven development strategies aimed at modern industrial enclaves which
 
engage relatively few.
 
Table 
 suggests a pattern which may not be entirely accidental.
 
It is arguable, though far from proven, that a distributionally-oriented
 
development program which integrates the poor into the mainstream of the
 
economy may cause a higher growth rate, other things equal. 
 Obversely,
 
a development strategy aimed at a limited segment of the economy may
 
result in a lower grrwth rate than could be achieved given that country's
 
resour..! endowment. In the present state of our knowledge, we do not
 
understand the dynamics of growth well enough to evaluate the merits of
 
this argument. Research on this question merits highest priority among
 
development economists and planners.
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AmericanProfessor Fields' article in the September 1977 
Economic Review on growth, poverty and distribution in 
Brazil, "Who Benefits from Development"? 
The current paper compares patterns of growth, employment 
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